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GRANTOR ENFORCEMENT OF TRUSTS:
STANDING IN ONE PRIVATE LAW SETTING
BY JOHN T. GAUBATZt

Courts sometimes allow an individual to maintain an action to enforce the
terms of a trust that he has created Typically, they just!fy such a decision by
statingthat the grantorwas a benefciary or trustee ofthe trust, or had a contractual right against the trustee, and thus had an enforceable interest in the trust.
None ofthese theories, however, easily explains the disparateresults in the cases.
Professor Gaubatzproposesthat traditionalstandinganalysisprovides an understandableframework within which to analyze the right of the grantorto enforce a
trust. Problems encounteredin grantorenforcement cases often are analogousto
those in the public law cases, and because of this similarity, standing doctrine
provides a clearand consistent analyticalmodelfor addressingproblemsofgrantor enforcement. Application of this analysisexposes the true interests at stake in
determiningthe grantor'sright to sue, andthereby helps to identfy the appropriate situationsforallowinggrantorenforcement of a trust. The Article applies the
conclusions to a number offact patterns that have yet to be litigated,in an attempt to assist the courts in resolvingpossiblechallenges to the grantor'sright to
bring the action.
The purpose of this Article is to describe the circumstances in which a
grantor has standing to enforce a trust that he has created. In spite of the
almost commonplace use of grantor trusts in estate planning, there is a surprising paucity of literature discussing when and how the grantor can enforce such
a trust. Although commentators have treated thoroughly the tax ramifications
of grantor trusts' and the general problems of enforcement of trusts by beneficiaries, 2 little attention has been paid to the question when, and to what extent,
an individual can enforce a trust that he has created and in which he has
retained several, some, or no powers or beneficial interests. 3 This lack of litert Professor of Law, University of Miami School of Law. B.S. 1964, Colorado State; J.D.
1967, Chicago. The author wishes to thank Professors Patrick 0. Gudridge of Miami and Craig
R. Callen of Mississippi College for their helpful critiques of earlier versions of this Article. Also
helpful were Professors Kenneth M. Casebeer and Thomas A. Robinson of Miami. Thanks are
also due to the University of Miami School of Law, whose summer research grant assisted in the

preparation of the Article, and to Professor Paul G. Haskell, now teaching at the University of
North Carolina, whose collegial question twelve years ago led me to consider the problems discussed in this piece.
1. See, e.g., Pedrick, Grantor Powersand the Tax Reform Act: End of an Era?, 71 Nw. U.L.

REv. 704 (1977).

2. See, e.g., 3 A. ScoTT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS §§ 197-226 (3d ed. 1967); G.G. BOGERT &
G.T. BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES §§ 861-960 (2d rev. ed. 1982) [hereinafter

cited as BOGERT].

3. The most notable lack of investigation is with respect to the enforceability of grantor

powers. Neither commentators Scott nor Bogert, see supra note 2, specifically addresses most trust
problems in the context of grantor powers. For example, in fourteen pages of discussion on the
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ature is surprising given the number of powers and interests that can be retained, the many reasons for their retention, and the possible conflicts between
the grantor, trustee, and beneficiaries.
If the grantor retains a beneficial interest, it is normally adverse to most
other interests in the same trust. 4 Thus, actions of the trustee can engender
conflict between the grantor and the holders of the other interests. Similarly,
most grantor powers control the value, if not the existence, of beneficial interests in the trusts,5 and their exercise usually adversely affects one or more beneficiaries. Further, this negative effect, with its potential for conflict, can result
whether the power is retained to protect the grantor (as with a power to revoke), or to control the flow of benefits to the beneficiaries (as with powers to
distribute income or corpus). Indeed, even retained administrative powers, the
exercise of which can improve some interests while diluting others in the same
trust, ultimately can pit the interests of one or more beneficiaries against the
will of the grantor, and thus raise the question of the grantor's right to force
6
compliance with his wishes.
In addition, the commonplace use of spendthrift clauses and "material
purpose" trusts to limit a beneficiary's power over property also suggests the
importance of a grantor's right to enforce the limitations in the trust instrument. A grantor who creates a spendthrift or material purpose trust relies on
the trustee to resist the importunings of the beneficiary to deviate from the
trust to his immediate advantage. If the beneficiary seeks such deviation, his
desires are contrary to those of the grantor, even if not contrary to the grantor's economic interests. The attempt thus raises the question of the grantor's
7
right to prevent the trustee from acceding to the beneficiary's demands.
Many circumstances exist in which the grantor is allowed to sue the
trustee to enforce the trust. Enough of these situations exist to prove false the
overstatement, common in the treatises, that a grantor who is not a beneficiary
lacks standing to enforce a trust.8 An analysis of the differences between sucduty of the trustee to the holder of a power, Scott devotes one paragraph to grantor powers. See 2
A. ScoTr,supra note 2, § 185, at 1478-79. Several factors explain the paucity of discussion on this
aspect of trust law. First, the rise of interest in grantor powers reflects the importance of the
income and transfer taxes to estate planning, and is thus of somewhat recent vintage. Second, the
power-holding grantor often is also the trustee, and thus has the power to enforce his own exercise
of the power. Finally, most independent trustees will comply with an exercise, rather than ignore
it; acceding is easier and may foster further business from the grantor.
4. The typical grantor retains an income interest that is adverse to the remainder interests of
other beneficiaries. Reversionary interests similarly are adverse to income interests of other beneficiaries, although reversionary interests may not be adverse to remainder interests with respect to
many issues questioning investment decisions.
5. The most common power undoubtedly is a power to revoke the trust. Examples of less
pervasive powers include the powers to distribute income or corpus, to control investments, and to
borrow trust funds.
6. For example, the power to control investments can be used to enhance or retard the
income flow of the trust. If, of course, the beneficiary agrees with the grantor's exercise of the
power, he may, as beneficiary, force the trustee to comply with the exercise. See generally Comment, DirectoryTrusts andthe Exculpatory Clause, 65 COLUM. L. Rav. 138, 145-51 (1965).
7. See Note, Right of a Settlor to Enforce a PrivateTrust, 62 HARV. L. REV. 1370, 1376
(1949).

8. "Where a trust is created inter vivos and the settlor is still alive, it would seem that he
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cessful grantor enforcement actions and those in which the grantor was denied
standing, however, has been lacking. This Article fills this void. The Article is
divided into three basic parts. Part I outlines the insufficiencies of traditional
doctrine as a basis for determining a grintor's standing in trust enforcement
actions, discusses the general problem of standing in the private law context,
and then suggests that standing concepts normally identified with public law
standing cases are useful in analyzing problems in the grantor-trust area. Part
II discusses circumstances in which the grantor's economic and other interests
give him standing to enforce a trust, whether or not his position is easily categorizable under traditional trust doctrine. Part III applies the conclusions of
part II to common grantor-trust settings for which there is currently no authority concerning the grantor's standing to sue.
In discussing grantor standing, the Article adopts the analysis of many of
the public law standing cases because the tools of such analysis prove useful in
grantor trust cases. By using that analysis in a private law area, however, the
Article inherently questions whether standing is a concept limited to public
law cases. By illustrating that concepts developed in deciding public law cases
are helpful in resolving private law cases, the Article naturally suggests that it
is not. The Article is not, however, a definitive discussion of standing in the
private law setting. That task must wait for another time, and perhaps another
author.
I.
A.

GRANTOR ENFORCEMENT AS A PROBLEM OF STANDING

The Importance of Standing Analysis in GrantorEnforcement Cases

Any comprehensive discussion of the grantor's right to enforce a trust
inevitably leads to a discussion of standing. Normal trust doctrine is simply
inadequate to resolve questions about the grantor's right to sue to enforce a
trust. As noted above, accepted trust doctrine states that the grantor cannot
enforce a trust; 9 yet a myriad of cases exist in which the grantor was allowed to
bring an enforcement action. Indeed, the opposite statement-that the grantor
may enforce-is not hard to find in judicial opinions. 10 The reason for the
inconsistency, of course, is that any such statement is inherently too broad to
be useful, and, as illustrated below, must be taken within the context of other
doctrine.
cannot maintain a suit to enforce the trust." 3 A. ScoTT, supra note 2, § 200.1, at 1643. See also
BOGERT, supra note 2, § 42 (2d ed. 1966). Cases often make similar statements in dictum. See,
e.g., Werbelovsky v. Manufacturers Trust Co., 12 A.D.2d 793, 209 N.Y.S.2d 564 (1961) (mem.)
(action to terminate or declare trust void, or to face invasion of trust); In re Butler's Trust, 29
Misc. 2d 225, 213 N.Y.S.2d 154 (Sup. Ct. 1961) (suit to revoke irrevocable trust). Statements that
the settlor may sue to enforce a trust are also often dictum. See, e.g., McGee v. Vanderventer, 326
Ill.
425,439, 158 N.E. 127, 133 (1927) (exercise of power of appointment); Garrison v. Little, 75 Ill.
App. 402 (1898) (questioning validity of charitable trust on final account of estate); Chapman v.

Wilbur, 4 Or. 362 (1873) (action for return of property).
9. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
10. See, e.g., Warren v. Mayor of Lyons City, 22 Iowa 351, 355 (1867) (misuse of public
square, when grantor owned adjacent land); Tate v. Woodyard, 145 Ky. 613, 615, 140 S.W. 1044,
1044 (1911) (lodge); Rowzee v. Pierce, 75 Miss. 846, 856, 23 So. 307, 308 (1898) (park).
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1. The Inadequacy of Beneficiary Analysis
One major doctrinal exception to the "no grantor enforcement" rule al-

ways is made for the grantor who is a beneficiary of the trust."t It is hornbook
law that beneficiaries may sue to enforce a trust against acts of the trustee that

affect their respective interests. 12 Thus, in many common situations, the grantor may enforce the trust because he is a beneficiary. That the beneficiary is

also the grantor does not limit this inherent right of beneficiaries to sue. Further, the grantor's right to sue exists when his beneficial interest is implied, as

well as when it is expressly retained.
Attempting to regulate the grantor's standing by using as a standard the
presence of a beneficial interest in the trust is problematical, however, because
of the difficulty in defining when a grantor is a beneficiary. The modern trust

is a flexible device, and the grantor may create interests and powers not easily
categorized in traditional terms. Reflecting this fact, most discussions of the
enforcement of beneficial rights assume that the plaintiff is a beneficiary, but
note that the extent of the beneficiary's interest depends on the intent of the

grantor. 13 Further, the traditional definition of beneficiary-those persons
whom the grantor intended to have an enforceable right' 4-is inherently selffulfilling unless limited to identifiable rights resembling equitable property interests. A proper definition of beneficiary must exclude persons who might
benefit incidentally from the performance of a trust established for the pur-

pose of benefiting someone else, 15 and those whose interest is defined by the
term "expectancy,"' 16 such as possible appointees of powers not in trust. It
must include, however, contingent beneficiaries, such as members of a class in
whose favor a power of appointment must be exercised, 17 as well as persons
whose interests are contingent on the happening of events, such as the death of
another beneficiary without surviving issue. Thus, a beneficiary should be de-

fined as an individual who has a vested or contingent right to require present
or future distribution of trust property to himself or for his benefit.

Such a limited definition, however, does not explain adequately a number
of cases in which a grantor was allowed to enforce a trust. For example, courts
11. There is no question that the grantor may be a beneficiary of a trust. Early trusts were
almost always trusts for the grantor. Indeed, this gave rise to the concept of the resulting trust-a
presumption that property transferred without consideration was for the benefit of the transferor.
Further, although grantor trusts that purported to pass the property to third parties at the death of
the grantor were at one time questioned as will substitutes, now they generally are deemed to be
valid and are so common that they have acquired the special name "living trusts." See 2 A.
ScoTr, supra note 2, § 114.
12. "Any beneficiary who can prove that the threatened or actual wrongdoing may or has
affected him adversely financially may bring an action for relief." BOGERT, supra note 2, § 871, at
125. See also 3 A. ScoTr, supra note 2, § 205.
13. See, e.g., BOGERT, supra note 2, § 182; 2 A. ScoTr, supra note 2, §§ 128, 128.3
14. Cf.BOGERT, supra note 2, § 182, at 258 (beneficiary is one "entitled to a direct benefit
from the trust").
15. See id.; 2 A. ScoT, supra note 2, § 126.
16. See BOGERT, supra note 2, § 182, at 261; L. SIMES, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF FUTURE
INTEREsTs § 58 (2d ed. 1966).
17. See L. SiMEs, supra note 16, § 80.
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often allow grantors to enforce the terms of major charitable gifts, '8 as well as
trusts for the support of children. 19 In neither case is the grantor a beneficiary
under any normal use of the term, although in both cases he has a personal, if
not economic, interest in seeing that the trust is maintained in accordance with
its terms. 20 Thus beneficiary analysis is inherently inadequate to the task of
determining when the grantor ought to be allowed to bring an action to enforce the trust. The tools for that determination must be sought elsewhere.
2. The Inadequacy of Fiduciary Analysis
A second doctrinal intrusion on the "no grantor enforcement" rule is that
a grantor who is a trustee may sue cotrustees to redress abuses of trust by
them. Not only is a trustee allowed to sue his cotrustees for wrongdoing on
their part, it is his duty to do so, 21 and failure in that duty can make him liable
for the loss. 2 2 It also is clear that a grantor may make himself a trustee or
cotrustee, 23 which would enable him to bring an action to enforce the trust.
Similarly, a grantor who is a guardian or conservator fbr a beneficiary
may bring an action to enforce the rights of the beneficiary. Both types of
fiduciaries lawfully may represent their wards in litigating claims of the
ward.

24

Unfortunately, the utility of trustee or fiduciary analysis is limited in
much the same way as is beneficiary analysis. It explains the ability of the
trustee-grantor to sue cotrustees, but does not help determine when a grantor
is to be deemed a trustee or fiduciary for the purposes of applying the doctrine.
As a result, it is of minimal help in deciding, for example, if a grantor may sue
to enforce his exercise of a retained power to control investments. 25 Rather, it
26
provides rhetoric for explaining the result.
3. The Inadequacy of Contract Analysis
Finally, a grantor's right to sue might be supported on the ground that he
was a promisee of a third-party beneficiary contract, with the trustee as a
promisor. Normally, the promisee may enforce a third-party beneficiary con18. See infra notes 82-91 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 92-96 and accompanying text.
20. Courts that seek a property-like "interest" in the trust as a test for determining a grantor's
standing to enforce the trust face much the same problem as do those trying to determine whether
the grantor is a beneficiary entitled to sue. Any such interest in a trust is the result of imposition
of enforceable duties on the trustee, in favor of the grantor. If the term were to be defined broadly
enough to allow enforcement in all of the appropriate cases, it would be too broad to exclude those
cases in which grantor enforcement of the trust would be inappropriate.
21. See generally 2 A. Scoarr, supra note 2, § 184.
22. See, e.g., First & Merchants Nat'l Bank v. Bank of Waverly, 170 Va. 496, 197 S.E. 462
(1938).
23. See generally 2 A ScoTr, supra note 2, § 100.
24. See infra notes 97-98 and accompanying text.
25. See infra text accompanying note 131 and notes 141-42 and accompanying text.
26. See K. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION-DECIDING APPEALS 77-92 (1960).
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tract as may the beneficiary, 2 7 although the promisee's relief usually is limited
to specific performance. The specific performance limitation does not present
practical problems because any relief would accrue to the trust estate. Thus,
contractual relief seems appropriate in the trust context.
The major difficulty with justifying a grantor suit on contractual grounds
is the often repeated statement that contractual relief is unavailable to enforce
trusts, 28 unless there is a separate agreement between the grantor and the
trustee for specific acts by the trustee beyond performance of the trust. 2 9 That
statement is too broad, however, because the cases do not universally support
it, 30 and the English cases normally cited as supporting the rule do not do so
for the grantor. 3 1 Nevertheless, the statement does act as a significant bar to
27. See 2

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 305, 307 (1979).

28. See 3 A. SCOTT, supra note 2, § 197.2; BOGERT, supra note 2, § 17.
29. See 3 A. SCOTT, supra note 2, § 197.2, at 1629.
30. See, e.g., Underhill v. United States Trust Co., 227 Ky. 444, 13 S.W.2d 502 (1929); Rosenblatt v. Birnbaum, 16 N.Y.2d 212, 212 N.E.2d 37, 264 N.Y.S.2d 521 (1965), a/9'g 20 A.D.2d
556, 245 N.Y.S.2d 72 (1963), rep"g 236 N.Y.S.2d 893 (1962) (suit to enjoin diversion of trust funds
intended for children of grantor). The contractual nature of the cause of action in Rosenblalt was
recognized in Associated Teachers of Huntington v. Board of Educ., 33 N.Y.2d 229, 306 N.E.2d
791, 351 N.Y.S.2d 670 (1973). Some cases appear to obscure the importance of any distinction
between trust and contract analysis. See, e.g., Hall v. Gardiner, 126 F.2d 227 (D.C. Cir. 1942)
(rights of second mortgagee against third mortgagee in possession); Wolosoffv. Gadsden Land &
Bldg. Corp., 245 Ala. 628, 18 So. 2d 568 (1944) (employees against developer of employee housing
contracted for by employer); City of Salem v. Attorney Gen., 344 Mass. 626, 183 N.E.2d 859
(1962) (declaratory judgment action to determine whether park could be used as school); In re
Reynold's Estate, 131 Neb. 557, 268 N.W. 480 (1936) (insured's personal representatives against
trustee of insurance trust for the payment of creditors). Cf. Trustees of Dartmouth College v.
Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 627 (1819) (trust protected by contract clause of Constitution):
It can require no argument to prove, that the circumstances of this case constitute a
contract. An application is made to the crown for a charter to incorporate a religious
and literary institution. In the application, it is stated that large contributions have been
made for the object, which will be conferred on the corporation as soon as it shall be
created. The charter is granted, and on its faith the property is conveyed. Surely in this
transaction every ingredient of a complete and legitimate contract is to be found.
.4ccordZn re Manning, 185 La. 894, 171 So. 68 (1936); Cary Library v. Bliss, 151 Mass. 364, 25
N.E. 92 (1890).
31. The only case that can be read as addressing the grantor's right to sue in contract allowed
the action. Megod's Case, 4 Leon. 225, 78 Eng. Rep. 40 (1585). The vast majority of the English
cases involved the right of a third-party beneficiary to sue in contract. Several, including Megod'r
Case; Smith v. Jameson, 5 T.R. 601, 101 Eng. Rep. 336 (1794); Jevon v. Bush, 1 Vern. 342, 23 Eng.
Rep. 508 (1685); and Butler v. Butler, 2 Sid. 21, 82 Eng. Rep. 1234 (1657), recognize the availability of an action at law. Three cases, Holland v. Holland, 4 L.R.-Ch. App. 449 (1869); Barnardiston v. Soame, 6 How. St. Trials 1063 (1674); and Turner v. Sterling, 1 Freem. 15, 89 Eng. Rep, 13
(K.B. 1671), deny the availability of the action. Other cases sought to establish a covenant running to the third-party beneficiary (which would give his claim preference against the trustee's
bankrupt estate). See Holland v. Holland, 4 L.R.-Ch. App. 449 (1869); Adey v. Arnold, 2 De G.,
M. & G. 432, 95 Rev. Rep. 151 (Ch. 1852). Given the ambivalence of the English courts to thirdparty beneficiary contracts, compare Dutton v. Poole, 2 Lev. 210 (K.B. 1677) with Bourne v. Mason, 1 Vent. 6 (K.B. 1669)and Tweddle v. Atkinson, I Best & S. 393 (Q.B. 1861);seegenerally 4 A.
CORBIN, CoRBN ON CONTRACrS § 839 (1951), the courts' refusal to recognize legal rights in the

beneficiary of a trust is not surprising. To extend the analysis to the promisee-grantor, however, is
another matter entirely and not justified by the cases.
Indeed, the English courts on occasion have allowed the grantor to bring an action at law to
enforce the obligation in the nature of trust. For example, in Gifford v. Manley, 25 Eng. Rep. 689
(1735), the grantor transferred funds to trustees to hold at interest, which transfer was acknowledged under seal. The trustee who received the funds failed to invest them, and then died, The
grantor sued the trustee's executor, and successfully urged that the obligation to him was a specialty debt. In ruling for the grantor, the Lord Chancellor stated:
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relying on the contract theory to support a grantor's right to sue the trustee.
This is especially true in light of the relative paucity of modem cases in which
the question of the grantor's contractual right to enforce a trust at law arises.
Although the lack of cases is understandable, 32 the few existing cases seem to
confirm that contractually-based relief is available if the agreement between
trustee to the
the grantor and the trustee indicates a promise running from the
33
grantor separate from the trustee's duties to the beneficiaries.
The weakness of contract analysis as a basis for standing is twofold. First,
it is not recognized universally; the treatise writers have fairly effectively convinced the courts of its unavailability. 34 Second, it does not resolve the question of when the underlying contract exists. Clearly, not all breaches of trust
I have no doubt but that this is a specialty debt: for, though breaches of trust are indeed
in some cases considered but as simple contract debts; yet,... here it must be otherwise,
by reason of the express acknowledgement under hand and seal, that he alone has received the whole money, and had received it as trustee for the particular purposes

mentioned.
Id. at 689. Not only was this not an unusual result, see, e.g., Mayor v. Davenport, 2 Sim. 227, 57
En. Rep. 774 (1828), it was evidently the normal result. See Holmes, EarlyEnglish Equity, 1 LAW

Q. REv. 162, 168 (1885). That the advantages of covenant are no longer available seems irrelevant

to the question whether law will enforce an obligation undertaken by the trustee to the grantor.
32. A variety of reasons explain the paucity of cases:
(a) In the early years of the development of trust theory, the law courts had not developed
contract theory, so the only relief for breach of an obligation was in trust. See Holmes, supra note
31, at 172-74. That contract relief developed after equity recognized the validity of trusts is also
unpersuasive as a reason for law courts to refuse currently to recognize a contractual obligation to
the grantor. First, to say that because the remedy at equity exists, and therefore the law courts
ought not interfere, is to reverse the jurisdictional predicate of equity courts. Second, the willingness of courts of law to involve themselves in trust questions in other settings, see BOGERT, supra
note 2, § 870, undercuts the analysis. Third, with the now almost universal merger of law and
equity jurisdictions into a single court, no deference would be real. For the same reason, it is
unpersuasive to say that the law courts lack the expertise to decide trust questions, and therefore
ought not recognize the obligation of the trustee as contractual; given the merger ofjurisdictions,
the same court will hear the issue in any event. Indeed, the need for a contractual clause of action
arises only when the grantor's connection with the trust is other than as a beneficiary, and rarely
will entitle him to damages. Thus, the nature of relief sought virtually always will be in the nature
of specific performance, and thus equitable. The "expert" equity court therefore will ultimately
hear the cause, even if it sounds in law.
(b) There were few advantages to bringing the action at law, because the equity courts could
provide any relief necessary.
(c) In testamentary trust cases, the grantor was dead, and the trustee owed no obligation to
his heirs.
(d) In most cases the grantor had no interest in the trust to enforce in contract, and thus
could not plead successfully an action at law. See, e.g., Padeiford v. Real Estate-Land Title &
Trust Co., 121 Pa. Super. 193, 183 A. 442 (1936). Normally the law does not provide damages for
emotional distress on breach of contract. See, e.g., Jankowski v. Mazzotta, 7 Mich. App. 483, 152
N.W.2d 49 (1967). Thus, without specific performance, no remedy would be available to the
grantor even if the trustee made a specific promise to the grantor regarding the manner of operation of the trust.
33. See Hopkins v. Women's Medical College, 331 Pa. 42, 200 A. 32 (1938) (promise to grant
scholarship not dependent on performance of endowment); Alumnae Ass'n of William Penn High
School v. Trustees of Univ. of Penn., 306 Pa. 283, 159 A. 449 (1932) (association can enforce right
to use endowed bed in hospital). The cause of action exists even though equitable relief for breach
of trust may be available to the beneficiaries, although when the grantor is the beneficiary, no
contract is implied. Cf. Padelford v. Real Estate-Land Title & Trust Co., 121 Pa. Super. 193, 183
A. 442 (1936) (action in assumpsit by grantor-beneficiary, claiming violation of investment restrictions and right to statutory interest, dismissed).
34. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRusTs § 197 (1959); cf. Nedd v. Thomas, 316 F. Supp.
74, 76-77 (M.D. Pa. 1970) (no right to jury trial, quoting Restatement).
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should leave the trustee liable to a contract action by the grantor. One would
think that in the normal case the trustee is entitled to limit his concerns to the
desires of the beneficiary. On the other hand, in some cases the importance of
particular terms of the trust should allow the grantor to enforce those terms.
Such distinctions are hard to apply to trust cases, however, because in all trust
situations an agreement exists between the trustee and the grantor, making
contractual distinctions difficult.
B.

GrantorEnforcement as a Problem of Standing

Standing analysis is the obvious alternative to using beneficiary, fiduciary,
or contract analysis for discussing the grantor's right to bring an enforcement
action. A significant barrier to such discussion, however, is the failure of
many courts to address the right in standing terms. Rather, decisions typically
discuss the grantor's right to bring the action either in terms of the existence of
a cause of action or in terms of his "interest" in the matter.3 5 Even when the
word "standing" appears in an opinion it usually is used as a conclusory statement, not as part of the analysis. 36 Little, if any, analysis exists on the question of standing to bring private law proceedings, reflecting the paucity of
contemporary standing analysis is limited to the
cases using the term. Instead,
37
general field of public law.
Notwithstanding the absence of standing rubric in grantor enforcement
cases, standing analysis seems an appropriate tool to use in analyzing those
cases. Breach of trust actions and public law actions are hauntingly similar. In
each, the plaintiff alleges that an individual or entity has violated duties imposed upon him, and that the violation is redressable by the defendant. In
trust cases, the defendant is the trustee and the duties are imposed in the trust
instrument. In the public law arena the defendant is a government employee
and his duties come from constitution, statute, or regulation. In both situations, however, the problem is whether the plaintiff has a cognizable right to
bring the action challenging the actions of the defendant. A grantor suing to
prevent a trustee from terminating a trust by distributing trust assets to the
only beneficiary can present much the same analytic problem as does an outdoors club suing the Secretary of the Interior to prevent leasing of wilderness
35. The reverse is also sometimes true, when, for example, public law courts discuss "standing" without addressing the underlying interest that gives rise to it. See, e.g., Warth v. Seldin, 422
U.S. 490 (1975). See generally Currie,MisunderstandingStanding, 1981 Sup. CT. REV. 41.
36. See, e.g., Smith v. Thompson, 266 Ill. App. 165 (1932); Dillaway v. Burton, 256 Mass.
568, 153 N.E. 13 (1926).
37. See K. DAvIs, 3 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE ch. 22 (1958 & Supp. 1976); L. TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 3-17 to -29 (1978); Chayes, The Supreme Court, 1981 TermForeword: PublicLaw Litigation andthe Burger Court, 96 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1982); Scott, Standing
in the Supreme Court-A FunctionalAnalysis,86 HARV. L. REV. 645 (1973). The proliferation of

standing cases in public law is of recent vintage. See infra notes 42-45. Discussion of standing in
early challenges to public activities tended to be articulated in terms of "interests" and "rights,"
see infra note 45, as did such discussions in equity cases generally. See, e.g., In re Debs, 158 U.S.
564, 582-86 (1895). It is interesting to note, in this connection, that one commentator has suggested that modem standing analysis is simply the way interest analysis is done in public law
cases. See Albert, Standing to ChallengeAdministrativeAction: An InadequateSurrogateforClaim
for Relief, 83 YALE L.J. 425, 476-77 (1974).
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land for a ski slope. 38 A doctor suing to prevent restrictions on the distribu-

tion of birth control devices, who claims that the restrictions abridge the privacy rights of his patients,39 is in much the same position as a grantor suing to

prevent an ex-spouse from misusing funds conveyed in trust for the support of
their children.40 In both trust enforcement and public law settings the issue is

of a particular individual's assertion of the defendant's
the appropriateness
41
obligations.

Standing analysis also is appropriate because its roots are in equity practice and the decline of the writ system of pleading, rather than in constitu-

tional litigation. Notwithstanding an occasional assertion in the literature that
standing is a modem concept, 42 references to it are found in older equity
cases,4 3 as well as in English parliamentary practice. 44 Indeed, many of the

early cases challenging governmental activity arose in the trust context, as governments sought to misuse donated or dedicated property. 4 5 Its general application is thus historically sound.
Finally, and most importantly, standing doctrine works. It focuses on the
immediate question of the grantor's right to sue, and as a result avoids the
inadequacies of normal trust doctrine in this context. 46 Consequently, as part
38. See Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
39. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
40. See Rosenblatt v. Birnbaum, 16 N.Y.2d 212, 212 N.E.2d 37, 264 N.Y.S.2d 521 (1965).
41. Standing exists when "a party has a sufficient stake in an otherwise justiciable controversy to obtain judicial resolution of that controversy." Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 731
(1972).
42. See, e.g., Chayes, supra note 37, at 8 n.27: "Indeed, the term 'standing' did not appear in
judicial opinions until the middle of the 20th century." Undoubtedly, however, the explosion of
standing cases in the twentieth century results from New Deal legislation arising at a time when
notice pleading was limiting the effectiveness of cause of action analysis.
43. See, e.g., City of Chicago v. Ward, 169 Ii. 392, 416, 48 N.E. 927, 935 (1897); Clark v.
Oliver, 91 Va. 421, 425, 22 S.E. 175, 176 (1895). Equity provided a fertile ground for the development of standing questions, because of its loose definition of parties:
[Equity's] fundamental principle concerning parties is, that all persons in whose favor or
against whom there might be a recovery, however partial, and also all persons who are so
interested, although indirectly, in the subject-matter and the relief granted, that their
rights or duties might be affected by the decree, although no substantial recovery can be
obtained either for or against them, shall be made parties to the suit.
I POMEROY'S EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 114, at 153 (5th ed. 1941).
44. For a discussion tracing the term to parliamentary practice, see J. VINING, LEGAL IDENTITY: THE COMING OF AGE OF PUBLIC LAW 55-56 (1978).
45. See, e.g., City of Chicago v. Ward, 169 Ill. 392, 48 N.E. 927 (1897); Rowzee v. Pierce, 75
Miss. 846, 23 So. 307 (1898) (right to sue in equity).
46. The analysis of grantor enforcement of trusts using concepts found in modern standing
analysis as developed in public law cases also has the attraction of making available a large mass
of sophisticated contemporary judicial analysis concerning the basic problem of when an individual should be allowed to judicially challenge wrongful actions that primarily injure someone else.
This analysis can illuminate distinctions made by the courts in the private law arena. In the
process, of course, it allows the public law analysis to be tested against cases arising in a more
traditional legal context. This, in turn, ultimately may assist in resolving some of the uncertainties
and ambiguities currently present in the standing arena. Because grantor trust enforcement
presents a variety of three-party litigation situations, it seems particulaly well suited as a medium
for testing the strength of standing analysis. In short, the mirror of trust law may illuminate the
strengths, the weaknesses, and the tensions in public law standing analysis.
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II shows, standing doctrine clearly defines the results of various trust cases and
it suggests appropriate results in cases previously unresolved.
II.

AN ANALYSIS OF GRANTOR STANDING

4. Introduction

A review of grantor enforcement cases suggests that concepts which have
been used by the courts to control standing in the public law setting also can
be applied to resolve questions of grantor standing. The first applicable con-

cept is that standing is not controlled by the existence of a legal interest of the
plaintiff,47 but rather by whether the plaintiff has suffered an injury in fact as a

result of the alleged act.48 As discussed in part I, distinctions involving legal
interests or beneficiaries do not distinguish easily those cases in which the
grantor has standing from those in which he does not. The basis of his standing clearly is different in quality from any recognized legal interest he might
have, although the basis of a particular grantor's action may be a legally cognizable interest.

The second concept of public law standing that helps describe a grantor's
standing to enforce a trust is that of zone of interests. Standing analysis in
public law demands that the plaintiff's interest be within the zone of interests
addressed by the statute or constitutional provision asserted.4 9 A similar con-

cept arises from the grantor trust cases. For example, grantors may be able to
enforce trusts established to support their children,5 0 although the other parent

may not5 1-the grantor has a foreseeable interest in seeing that his children
are provided for, although the circumstances do not suggest an intention to
benefit the other spouse by creating the trust.
The third useful concept is that the creator of legal rights may determine
47. See Stewart, The Reformation ofAmerican Administrative Law, 88 HARv. L. REV. 1667,
1723-25 (1975).
48. See Association of Data Processing Serv. Org. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 152 (1970) (new
competition constitutes injury in fact even if plaintiff has no legal interest in freedom from
competition).
49. Id. at 153-56; Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 102-03 (1968). See L. TRIBE, supra note 37,
§ 3-17; Chayes, supra note 37, at 23. See also Restatement of Torts § 286 (1934): "The violation of
a legislative enactment ... makes the actor liable for the invasion of an interest of another if: (a)
the intent of the enactment is ... to protect the interest of the other as an individual, and (b) the
interest invaded is one which the enactment is intended to protect."
50. See, e.g., Rosenblatt v. Birnbaum, 16 N.Y.2d 212, 212 N.E.2d 37, 264 N.Y.S.2d 521
(1965) (action to enjoin diversion of funds). Compare Landau v. Ostrowe, 50 Misc. 2d 474, 270
N.Y.S.2d 722 (Sup. Ct. 1966), in which no trust was found to exist. The theoretical basis for
standing to enforce trusts for the support of dependents of the grantor is similar in effect to that
describing the standing of taxpayers to challenge government expenditures, based on the assumption that a favorable ruling will reduce their taxes. See Jaffe, The Citizen as Litigant in Public
Actions. The Non-Hohfeldianor IdeologicalPlaintf, 116 U. PA. L. REV. 1033, 1034 (1968). In the
private trust setting, however, standing would exist only if the parent were also the grantor. A
parent's interest normally would be outside the zone of interests to be protected by a trust established by someone else, even if the trust's performance would reduce the parent's legal obligations.
Although one can presume that a grantor would see that a trust for the benefit of his children
would also benefit himself, no such presumption is necessary if the trust is established by another.
51. See, e.g., City Bank Farmers Trust Co. v. Macfadden, 274 A.D. 1039, 85 N.Y.S.2d 791
(per curiam), af'dmem., 299 N.Y. 711, 87 N.E.2d 124 (1949).
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who has standing to enforce them, up to the limitation imposed by article III
of the Constitition that a case or controversy exist. The public law cases suggest this result with respect to Congress creating standing in individuals to
enforce the acts of Congress, 5 2 and a similar concept is found in the ability of
the creator of a charitable foundation or trust to appoint visitors to enforce the
53

charitable gift.

A fourth concept of public law standing is that persons in a fiduciary
relationship with others may sue to protect the rights of their beneficiaries
within the scope of the relationship.5 4 Thus, for example, trustees may sue to
enforce the terms of a trust against their cotrustees,5 5 just as a guardian may
sue to represent the interests of his ward, a best friend to represent the interests
57
of a minor,56 and an organization to represent the interests of its members.
Fifth is that the plaintiffs injury does not need to be economic,5 8 although it must be substantial. 59 Although most grantor enforcement actions
52. See Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church &
State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464 (1982). The Court sometimes has expressed a prudential limitation requiring that the plaintiff assert more than generalized and undifferentiated grievances common to
all members of the public. See, e.g., United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974); Schlesinger
v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208 (1974). Many early equity cases suggest a
similar standard in requiring that the plaintiff have an interest beyond that of the general public.
See, e.g., Packet Co. v. Sorrells, 50 Ark. 466, 474-75, 8 S.W. 683, 685-86 (1888); Wilkins v. Chicago, St. L. & N.O. R.R., 110 Tenn. 422, 464-65, 75 S.W. 1026, 1036 (1903). Congress may avoid
prudential limitations by creating standing to the fullest extent permitted by U.S. CoNsT. art. III,
see Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 372 (1982); Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of
Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 100 (1979), although it is sometimes difficult to discern whether it has done
so. See Stewart & Sunstein, Public Programsand PrivateRights, 95 HARV. L. REv. 1193 (1982).
In trust cases, the grantor, as the creator of the rights being asserted, seemingly would have an
equivalent right to determine his future standing to enforce the duties created, and, for obvious
reasons, would have no difficulty fulfilling the "differentiated interest" standard.
53. See generally 4 A. Scorr, supra note 2, § 391; BOGERT, supra 2, § 416.
54. See Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez 102 S. Ct. 3260 (1982)
(commonwealth suing asparenspatriae).
55. See 3 A. SCOTT,supra note 2, § 200.2. Although one might be tempted to justify representational standing by reference to the public law cases justifying "surrogate" standing. see, e.g.,
FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470 (1940) (competitor allowed to represent public
interest in challenging license award), the two have different bases. Surrogate standing requires
that the surrogate suffer direct economic injury, see Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 737
(1972), which is not always present in representational standing cases. See Stewart, supra note 47,
at 1745. Problems of representational standing may be more closely analogous to problems of
permissive intervention, under FED. R. Civ. P. 24(b), by parties who might be derivatively liable
for damages in an action. See, e.g., Lemelson v. Larami Corp., 32 Fed. R. Serv. 2d (Callaghan)
1133 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (intervention by possible contributory infringer in patent infringement action). Note, however, that to the extent that standing is considered a problem of allocation of
judicial resources, standing to intervene does not create the same tension as does standing to
initiate the action.
56. Best friend pleading was necessary in equity pleading, because infants and married women were not allowed to bring an action in their own name, since they lacked the ability to make
themselves responsible for costs. See generally C. COOPER, PLEADING ON THE EQUITY SIDE OF
THE HIGH COURT OF CHANCERY 27-33 (1809).
57. See, e.g., San Diego County Council, Boy Scouts of Am. v. City of Escondido, 14 Cal.
App. 3d 189, 92 Cal. Rptr. 186 (1971) (boy scout council has standing to sue to prohibit diversion
of land in trust for benefit of scouts).
58. Cf.Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972) (plaintiff must have suffered direct

injury).
59. It has been said that to pass constitutional muster the plaintiff must allege "such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharp-
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are brought to protect the economic interests of either the grantor or persons
he represents, economic harm is not necessary to support a grantor enforcement action. A grantor may also sue to protect substantial expectation interests. Thus, grantors are allowed to enforce the terms of major gifts to
charities, 60 as well as trusts created to maintain children after a divorce, 6 1 alexpectations presumably were less substanthough other contributors, whose
62
tial, may be denied standing.
Finally, in grantor trust cases, as in the public law cases, the grantor's
63
interest (and thus his injury) must have some nexus with the alleged wrong.
It is often said of breach of trust actions that they must relate to the interest of
the plaintiff.64 For example, a remainderman may not sue to require the
trustee to distribute income from the trust, or to object to investments on the
ground that they produce insufficient income. The cases are similar to the
connection bepublic law doctrine, which requires a "traceable injury"-a
65
tween the injury complained of and the alleged wrong.
The discussion that follows accepts these concepts as applicable to a discussion of grantor standing, even though the weight given to each is uncertain
in the public law context. That uncertainty does not detract from the utility of
the concepts in discussing the grantor's standing to enforce a trust. Nor does it
detract from the value of contrasting the private law results with the public
law model. For example, the analysis that follows relies heavily on the "zone
of interest" concept, even though that concept is on the wane in public law
cases;66 zone of interests analysis proves particularly helpful in trust cases.
The extent to which such a public law concept is helpful in resolving the grantor standing problem may suggest a rethinking of the appropriateness of the
concept in the public law forum. 67
B. An Analysis of Existing Grantor Standing
Grantors generally have standing to enforce trusts in three types of situations. First, the grantor has standing if his economic interest in the subject
ens the presentation 8f issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult
constitutional questions." Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962). But see United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP), 412 U.S. 669 (1973).
60. See, e.g., Woman's Hosp. League v. City of Paducah, 188 Ky. 604, 223 S.W. 159 (1920)

(action to enjoin conversion of facility constructed with funds contributed by plaintiff).
61. See, e.g., Carr v. Carr, 185 Iowa 1205, 171 N.W. 785 (1919).
62. See, e.g., Smith v. Thompson, 266 111.App. 165 (1932) (contributor to public charitable
trust lacks standing to challenge, absent special facts beyond contribution).
63. See Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church &
State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464,472 (1982); Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 41-42
(1976); Chayes, supra note 37, at 16-22.
64. See, e.g., Badham v. Johnston, 239 Ala. 48, 193 So. 420 (1940) (rights of contingent beneficiary limited to preventing wrongful diversion of trust funds).
65. See Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 41-42 (1976).
66. See Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church &
State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464 (1982).
67. For a defense of the zone of interest test, see Note, A Defense of the "Zone of Interests"
Standing Test, 1983 DUKE L.J. 447.
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matter of the alleged breach was sufficiently foreseeable at the creation of the
trust that protection of the interest by the grantor can be said to have been
intended. Second, he has standing if the breach violated the grantor's substantial expectations, if those expectations resulted from the trustee's actions in
soliciting or accepting the trust. Third, standing has been allowed if the grantor acts as a representative of beneficial interests, either by lawful appointment, appointment under the trust instrument, or by recognition of the equity
court. The word "interest" is used in the sense described above, 68 and includes a number of interests other than merely economic interests. Further,
the requirement in the first two categories that this interest be foreseeable reflects the "zone of interests" analysis familiar to public law standing, and explains why some grantors, who have a real interest in the matter at issue, are
denied standing to pursue that matter. Of course, because courts rarely discuss
the matter in standing terms, such an analysis cannot be found in the opinions.
It does, however, describe the way in which the cases actually are resolved.
This can be illustrated by a review of the situations in which courts have found
grantor standing to exist.
1. Grantor Standing Based on Economic Interests
The most common cases in which a grantor has standing are those in
which he has an economic interest in the performance of the trust, an interest
that was intended either expressly or impliedly to be protected by the trust
duties. Persons intended to have such an interest usually are referred to as
beneficiaries of the trust, and whenever a grantor is defined by a court to have
standing as a beneficiary of the trust, the court is validating the concept that an
intended economic interest in the trust's performance is a sufficient basis for
standing to enforce it. On the other hand, when a court labels a plaintiff an
"incidental beneficiary," it is saying that, in spite of the plaintiff's economic
interest in the trust, he lacks standing, normally because that interest is not
within the zone of interests that the grantor intended for the trustee to protect.
Grantor standing has been found to exist, however, even when the grantor lacked a traditionally-defined beneficial interest in the trust. In many such
cases the grantor possessed an economic interest in the trust's performance,
even though a traditionally-defined beneficial interest did not exist. For this
reason, this section is defined in terms of economic, rather than beneficial,
interests in the trust. A grantor's standing based on economic interests will be
divided into two categories: the first includes situations in which standing is
based on economic interests that are either expressly retained or implied in
law (such as resulting trust interests). In the second, standing is based on economic interests not so retained, but which are within the zone of interests that
the trust's terms are intended to protect. This second category is composed
almost entirely of economic interests other than traditionally-defined beneficial interests.
68. See supra notes 58-62 and accompanying text.
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a. Express economic interests

To say that courts recognize a grantor's express economic interests is to
state the obvious. Anyone with an economic interest created by the express
trust terms is a traditional beneficiary. A grantor who expressly retains trust
interests is a beneficiary of the trust and has standing under traditional analysis. 69 Thus, for example, a grantor who retains the right to income from the
trust has standing to enforce that income right. Similarly, a grantor who retains rights to the distribution of corpus may sue to enforce those rights.
Grantor standing based on express interests in the trust is consistent with
normal standing analysis. For example, a grantor who has an economic interest in the performance of a trust obviously suffers real injury if that interest is
defeated, and would satisfy the normal injury in fact test used in the standing
cases. Because the affected interest was created by the duties imposed on the
trustee, the injury would be caused directly by the violation of those duties,
and the injury would satisfy any nexus requirement. Likewise, an express interest clearly is within the zone of interests which the trustee's duties were
established to protect. Unlike a person whose interest in the performance of
the trust is incidental, because he is not expressly mentioned in the trust document, the grantor with an expressly retained interest is clearly intended to benefit from the performance; therefore, any zone of interests limitation which
might haunt traditional standing analysis is avoided.
b.

Economic interests by operation of law

Clear economic interests also often arise in the trust context by operation
of law. For example, upon the failure of a charitable trust, the grantor or his
heirs are said to have a resulting trust interest, 70 which they can enforce. Similarly, the doctrine of worthier title can result in the grantor having retained an
interest even though he apparently had attempted to dispose of his entire interest in the assets. 7 1 In both situations, the law recognizes that the holder of
the interest can sue to protect the interest, even though the interest was not
express.
The grantor's standing to enforce interests that arise by operation of law
also is consistent with traditional standing analysis. Once the grantor is said to
have an interest by operation of law, he immediately has an economic interest
in the performance of the trust, which could be injured if the trustee violates
his duties. Further, that interest can be deemed to be within the zone of interests intended for protection by the creation of the trust. In the resulting trust
case, the grantor normally did not intend for the trustee to be able to benefit if
69. See, e.g., Carter v. Uhlein, 36 A. 956 (N.J. Ch. 1897) (equity of redemption). An action
against a charity alleging the failure of a condition of a charitable gift asserts an interest similar to
a right of reentry, and would fall within this category. See, e.g., Sumner v. Darnell, 128 Ind. 38,
27 N.E. 162 (1891) (action by heirs).
70. See 5 A. ScoTr, supra note 2, § 413.
71. See, e.g., Doctor v. Hughes, 225 N.Y. 305, 122 N.E. 221 (1919) (remainder in the heirs of
the grantor constitutes a reversion). But see Hatch v. Riggs Nat'l Bank, 361 F.2d 559 (D.C. Cir,
1966).
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the express beneficiaries failed, and so the intent to benefit himself can be
presumed. Similarly, a grantor's interest under the doctrine of worthier title is
implied in law to be intended, and thus to be within the zone of interests
intended.
c. Implied economic interests
Sufficient cases exist to support standing based on the grantor's economic
interests that are affected adversely by the alleged act and that are not protected by the trust terms, but that impliedly were to be protected by the
trustee's duties. Further, review of the cases suggests that such implied-interest standing exists when the grantor's economic interest in the performance of
the trust either existed, or was foreseeable, when the trust was created. In
standing terms, this existence or foreseeability establishes that the grantor's
interest was within the zone of interests intended to be protected by the trust
duties, even though no beneficial interest in the trust was retained expressly.
Several categories of cases have allowed grantor actions under circumstances fitting the above description. One includes cases in which a grantor
has contributed part of a parcel of land to a municipality, for use as a school or
park, 72 while retaining the remaining portion of the land. A park, by its nature, inures to the benefit of land adjacent to it, and the adjacent landowners
have an economic interest in seeing that the land remains a park. The grantor's restricting the use of contributed land implies a desire that the restriction
benefit his retained land, putting his economic interest within the zone of interests intended to be protected by the restriction. Thus, if the restriction is
violated, the grantor may enforce it against the grantee, even though an action
by a grantor who did not retain adjacent land would fail (because of no implication of continued benefit), as would an action by other adjacent landowners
(because the restriction does not imply an intent to benefit non-grantors).
A similar type of case allows a grantor who is a member of a church or
lodge the right to enforce the use of property he gives to the organization for
the purposes of the grant. Because the grantor is a member of the congregation or lodge, he will benefit from the organization's use of the property that
he has given for as long has he chooses to belong to the congregation or lodge.
Ceasing to use the property for the restricted purpose injures him in a way
directly related to his retained interest. Further, the foreseeability of his benefiting from use of the property in the manner described in the granting instrument suggests that the restriction on the property's use was inserted, at least in
part, for his benefit, and that his use was within the zone of interests protected
by the restriction on the property's use. Therefore he may sue to enforce the
73
restriction.
72. See, e.g., Warren v. Mayor of Lyons City, 22 Iowa 351 (1867) (misuse of public square);
Rowzee v. Pierce, 75 Miss. 846, 23 So. 307 (1898) (park). See also Whitney v. Union Ry., 77 Mass.
(11 Gray) 359 (1858); United Fuel Gas Co. v. Morley Oil & Gas Co., 102 W. Va. 374, 135 S.E. 399

(1926) (action on covenant).
73. See Tate v. Woodyard, 145 Ky. 613, 140 S.W. 1044 (1911) (lodge); Ludlam v. Higbee, 11
N.J. Eq. 342 (1857) (island church). See also Nelson v. Monitor Congregational Church, 74 Or.
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Yet another type of case recognizing economic interest standing notwithstanding the lack of an express beneficial interest includes those cases in which
the performance of the trust will relieve the grantor of a foreseeable legal obligation. For example, if a trust is established for the support of persons whom
the grantor is legally obligated to support, the grantor has an economic interest
in the support being provided to the beneficiary, and the trustee's failure to
provide the support will cause him injury. In addition, because the support
provision in the trust will relieve the grantor's legal obligation, it is logical to
assume that he intended the trustee's provisioning of support to supplant his
own. This, in turn, implies that the grantor intended to benefit indirectly from
the trust, and that he intended his economic interest to be within the zone of
interests intended to be protected by the trust. Thus, a failure of the trust to
74
provide the required support is actionable by the grantor.
Finally, recognition of implied economic interests may also be seen in
cases in which a grantor sues to require compliance with retained powers. For
example, it is not uncommon to retain voting rights of stock in closely-held
companies when the stock is placed in trust.75 If the grantor owns other shares

in the company, or is employed by the company, he has an economic interest
in how those shares are voted, because the vote can affect the value of those
other shares, or his job. Further, the significance of the power to vote for those
shareholder or employee interests suggests that a grantor who has such interests and who retains a voting right does so to protect his interests. Therefore
his interest in the voting right is within the zone of interests created by that
term in the trust instrument. Thus, although cases enforcing the right to vote
stock76 usually do not discuss the matter of standing, their existence is easily
explainable in standing terms.
162, 145 P. 37 (1914) (subsequent contributor lacks standing to question acts of grantee church
when he is not a member); Strong v. Doty, 32 Wis. 381 (1873) (grantor not member of the grantee
church). To the extent that the grantor's interest is deemed not to be economic, his standing could
be grounded on the denial of a substantial expectation interest. See infra notes 77-96 and accom-

panying text.
74. See Carr v. Carr, 185 Iowa 1205, 171 N.W. 785 (1919); Rosenblatt v. Birnbaum, 16
N.Y.2d 212, 212 N.E.2d 37, 264 N.Y.S.2d 521 (1965) (action to enjoin diversion of funds).
75. See, e.g., United States v. Byrum, 408 U.S. 125 (1972).
76. Cf. EccIestone v. Indialantic, Inc., 319 Mich. 248, 29 N.W.2d 679 (1947) (retention of
voting rights until liquidation, by director and president of company); Clowes v. Miller, 60 N.J.
Eq. 179,47 A. 345 (1900) (business trust). Enforcement of the right to vote may be by an action to
enjoin the trustee voting, see Georgia Granite R.R. v. Miller, 144 Ga. 665, 87 S.E. 897 (1916), or to
require the trustee to grant the grantor a proxy to vote the stock. See, e.g., Pennsylvania R.R. v.
Pennsylvania Co. for Ins. on Lives & Granting Annuities, 205 Pa. 219, 54 A. 783 (1903).
In general, the right to vote corporate shares is determined by title as registered on the corporate books. 5 0. SMITH, FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 2033
(rev. ed. 1976). Therefore, a transfer of stock into trust would not deny automatically the grantor
the right to vote the shares. See id § 2035. Compare DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 217(a) (1974).
Transfer of shares to the trustee, however, entitles the trustee to have his ownership registered on
the books of the corporation, and his right to vote the shares is thereupon presumed. Therefore,
unless the grantor reserves the power to vote, either expressly or by implication from the terms of
the instrument, see Georgia Granite R.R. v. Miller, 144 Ga. 665, 87 S.E. 897 (1916), the trustee
would thereupon be entitled to vote the shares.
Although a contractually retained right to vote sold shares may be invalid, see F. O'NEAL,
CLOSE CORPORATIONS § 5.36 (2d ed. 1971); cf. Thibadeau v. Lake, 40 Idaho 456, 234 P. 148 (1925)
(period of proxy not limited), controls on the voting of closely held stock are generally not against
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2. Standing Based on Expectation Interests

Even if the grantor cannot show a personal economic interest in the per-

formance of the trust, courts have allowed him to enforce it if the circumstances of the creation of the trust are such that the alleged wrong violates
substantial reasonable expectations arising from the promise of the trustee accepting the trust. As noted above, 7 7 noneconomic interests are sufficient to

support standing in equity. 78 It therefore is not surprising that grantors also
have standing to enforce trusts in a variety of situations in which their interests
are not clearly economic.
Grantor standing based on noneconomic interests has been found to exist
in trust enforcement cases whenever the situation suggests violation of sub-

stantial reasonable expectations of the grantor arising from the creation of the
trust. If the express representations of the trustee provided an incentive for the

creation of the trust, and were sufficient to create in the grantor substantial
expectations that the terms of the trust would be carried out as stated, grantor

action to force compliance is allowed. Standing also exists if the circumstances surrounding the creation of the trust imply the existence of such expec-

tations. Because of the substantiality of the expectations, equity acts to
prevent their wrongful defeat by allowing the grantor to redress material misrepresentations by the trustee when obtaining the trust, whether or not the
misrepresentations were intentional. In short, if the nature of the trustee's act
is such that it is reasonable to assume that the grantor would not have established the trust if he had known that the act would occur, then the grantor has

standing to litigate the trustee's action, regardless of a continued economic
public policy. See Edson v. Norristown-Penn Trust Co., 359 Pa. 386, 59 A.2d 82 (1948); F.
O'NE.AL, supra, § 5.38.
77. See supra notes 58-62 and accompanying text.
78. See Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972). Although some early cases suggested
that equity would not protect personal, rather than property, rights, see Gee v. Pritchard, 36 Eng.
Rep. 670 (1818), a variety of personal rights are now protected, especially in the contract setting.
See, e.g., Ritter v. Couch, 71 W. Va. 221, 76 S.E. 428 (1912) (relative of the dead granted standing
to prevent closing of cemetery by city). See generally W. WALSH, A TREATiSE ON EQUITY 277-78
(1930); Note, The Protection ofPersonalRights in Equity Since 1946, 32 B.U.L. REv. 419 (1952).
The development of this enforcement of personal rights in some ways mirrors the development of
the injury-in-fact test of standing.
What standing does the father have to enjoin the use of a different name [by his
child]? The interest of the father in having his child bear his surname has been described
as one of "inherent concern," Robinson v. Hansel, [302 Minn. 34,] 223 N.W.2d 138
(1974); or a "natural," "fundamental," "primary," or "time honored" right. But is it a
legal right? Texas holds that the father has an interest protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution, however, Georgia holds that the interest
of the father is not a property interest entitled to constitutional protection but merely a
custom of persons to bear the names of their parents. Fulghum v. Paul 229 Ga. 463, 192
S.E.2d 376 (1972). We agree with the Georgia courts. Although hereditary surnames are
customary, that custom has never amounted to a common law legal right.
Whatever the nature of the father's interest, courts have generally recognized that
the father has a protectible interest in having his child bear the parental surname in
accordance with the usual custom, even though the mother may have been awarded
custody of the child. Robinson v. Hansel, supra; and see generally Annot. 53 A.L.R.2d
914.
Laks v. Laks, 25 Ariz. App. 58, 60, 540 P.2d 1277, 1279 (1975).
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79
interest in the trust.

Three types of cases illustrate the application of this principle in grantor
enforcement cases. The first, discussed above,8 0 includes cases in which a
member of a church or lodge who gives property for a building is allowed to
enforce use of the property for that purpose. To the extent that the expectation
of future use is not deemed to be economic, his standing is easily explainable
on the basis of substantial expectation interests. The second clear group of
expectation cases includes those in which, as a result of the active intervention
of the trustee, a gift is made creating a charitable trust, only to see the trustee
later depart from his representations concerning the use of the trust property. 81
The third group includes those cases in which the grantor is allowed to enforce
a trust, created for his children as a part of a divorce settlement, against the
attempts of his divorced spouse to misuse the trust assets.
The standing of the grantor to enforce substantial expectations arising
from the creation of a charitable trust is illustrated by Woman's Hospital
League v. City of Paducah.82 In that case, an association that had contributed
one-half of the cost of an isolation ward in a city hospital was allowed to bring
an action to enjoin conversion of the ward into a residence for nurses. The
league proposed the building, and offered one-half its cost; the city agreed to
the proposal, constructed the building, received the funds from the league, and
then operated the facility. When the city later threatened to convert the facility, the action was brought. The court held that the city's agreement prevented
diversion of the facility for other uses, citing the conditional receipt of the
funds, 83 and allowed the association to maintain the action. In so doing, the
court inherently recognized that because the city breached the association's
expectations, the association had standing to enforce the terms of the grant,
even though the association did not allege any economic harm to itself.
Although courts often allow a grantor to enforce a charitable trust that he
was solicited to create, they have been less willing to allow the same right to
79. The contractual nature of the basis for this type of standing explains why the heirs of the
grantor lack standing to enforce the promise, see Cary Library v. Bliss, 151 Mass. 364, 377-379, 25
N.E. 92, 95 (1890); Wemme v. Noyes, 134 Or. 590, 294 P. 602 (1930) (en banc); id. at 595, 295 P. at
465 (Rand, J., dissenting), as does the grantor's executor. See Judkins v. Hyannis Pub. Library
Ass'n, 302 Mass. 425, 19 N.E.2d 727 (1939). Without any express reference to the grantor's heirs

or successors, there is nothing to suggest a promise to anyone other than the grantor himself.
80. See supra text accompanying note 73.
81. To be distinguished here are actions to enforce a resulting trust upon failure of a condition on the gift, cf.Green v. Old People's Home, 269 11. 134, 109 N.E. 701 (1915) (action by heirs),
or upon failure of the trust purpose without application of cypres, cf.Trustees of Presbyterian
Church v. Venable, 159 111.215, 42 N.E. 836 (1896) (action by heirs). In such cases, the grantor
would clearly have a present economic interest.
82. 188 Ky. 604, 223 S.W. 159 (1920).
83. Id. at 615-16. Accord Rector of Church v. Crawford, 43 N.Y. 476 (1871) (dictum). See
also Tate v. Woodyard, 145 Ky. 613, 140 S.W. 1044 (1911); Chambers v. Baptist Educ. Soc'y, 40
Ky. (1 B. Mon.) 215 (1841). In Chambers a college brought an action against a subscriber for
payment of a subscription to the college. The subscriber defended on the ground that contributions by the original contributor to the college had been misused. The court rejected the defense
on the ground that no representations made to the defendant had been broken, so that he lacked
standing to complain. The court noted, however, that the original grantor would have had standing to enforce the representations.
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either contributors to existing trusts, or multiple contributors to a new trust.
This is true even if the contributions were solicited,8 4 unless circumstances

suggest that the solicitations were designed to create a significant expectation
in the contributors. 85 Even in the latter case, the courts may require that all
contributors be represented in the action.8 6 For example, in Smith v. Thompson 87 several early contributors to a flood relief fund were denied standing to
complain of diversion of the funds to a flood prevention organization. In denying their standing, the court distinguished cases in which the plaintiff contributed such a significantly large portion of the trust that it entitled him to
visitorial rights over the trust.8 8 Thus, the court recognized the reduced rights
of individual contributors in the multiple-contributor setting.
The individual contributor's lack of standing to enforce the use of solicited contributions reflects the need for a substantial expectation as the basis for
standing. Both the size of the normal contribution8 9 and the number of contributors undercut any presumption that an individual contributor has any significant expectation to be protected by giving him standing to enforce the trust.
Indeed, charities normally exist for a long time, necessitating change. A gift to
an existing charity, even if solicited, therefore suggests acceptance of the possibility that the gift will be used in ways not originally contemplated. 90 This is
the antithesis of a promise to use the gift only for the particular purpose, and
undercuts any reason equity might have for allowing the action. 9 '
84. Without the solicitation, of course, there would be no reason to assume that trustee activity caused the gift. Therefore, mere creation of, or contribution to, a trust dces not give standing

to enforce it. See, e.g., O'Hara v. Grand Lodge, 213 Cal. 131, 2 P.2d 21 (1931) (lodge that founded
and contributed to orphanage lacked standing to contest sale of orphanage property); Holmes v.
Trustees of Wesley M.E. Church, 58 N.J. Eq. (13 Dick) 327, 330 (1899); Clarke v. Oliver, 91 Va.
421, 22 S.E. 175 (1895) (contributors for establishing industrial school, alleging diversion of
funds); Strong v. Doty, 32 Wis. 381 (1873); cf. Trustees of Lone Oak Graded School Dist. v.
Gentry, 220 Ky. 703, 295 S.W. 1063 (1927) (declaratory judgment action by charity). But see Tate
v. Woodward, 145 Ky. 613, 140 S.W. 1044 (1911).
85. See, e.g., Larkin v. Wikoff, 75 N.J. Eq. 462, 72 A. 98, 79 A. 365 (1909) (contributors to
chapel).
86. See id The court's requirement that the plaintiffs bring a class action prevents attributing the plaintifirs standing to an implied reservation of a use (and therefore economic) interest, see
Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972); the possibility of a future class action normally does
not prevent an individual from bringing an action. Thus, the case suggests an alternative analysis:
that the requirement that expectations be significant requires that grantor standing not be bifurcated among contributors. See also Rowzee v. Pierce, 75 Miss. 846, 23 So. 307 (1898) (grantors of
land for public park have standing to prevent its diversion). When the subject of the gift is land,
the action is often brought in covenant. See, e.g., Board of Supervisors v. Bedford High School,
92 Va. 292, 23 S.E. 299 (1895). The latter actions are subject, however, to the balancing of equities. See Robinson v. Edgell, 57 W. Va. 157, 49 S.E. 1027 (1905).
87. 266 Ill. App. 165 (1932).
88. See, e.g., Tyree v. Bingham, 100 Mo. 451 (1889).
89. See id.
90. The duration of trusts may mean that a substantial period has passed between the contribution and the diversion of funds by the charity. This period itself reduces the likelihood of an
action by the grantor, in that he may be dead, or his interest in the charity may have waned.
91. "[S]ubsequent contributors are subject to the. . . conditions [of the originil grant], and
the heaviest have no such interest as will entitle them to come into court in their own name, but,
like others, they must be represented by the attorney-general." State ex rel. Pittman v. Adams, 44
Mo. 570, 582 (1869). See also Holden Hosp. Corp. v. So. Ill. Hosp. Corp., 22 Ill. 2d 150, 174
N.E.2d 793 (1961); McFarland v. Atkins, 594 P.2d 758, 762-63 (Okla. 1978); Leeds v. Harrison, 7
N.J. Super. 558, 72 A.2d 371 (1950).
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Standing based on disappointment of substantial expectation interests
also can explain why the grantor is allowed to enforce trusts created as a part
of a divorce settlement. It is not unusual, in the divorce context, for a trust to
be created and funded by one spouse, and trusteed by the other spouse or a
third party. These trusts typically have one of two purposes: (a) to guarantee
the financial well-being of children of the marriage; or (b) to provide for the
beneficiary spouse during life or before remarriage, while preserving the
corpus for the benefit of other beneficiaries selected by the grantor spouse. In
either case, the grantor has an obvious continuing personal interest in seeing
that the trust is properly fulfilled. Not surprisingly, courts have allowed the
grantor spouse to maintain an action to enforce the trust if the trustee violates
its terms.
Illustrative of the grantor's right to enforce trusts for the primary benefit
of the grantor's children is Rosenblatt v. Birnbaum,92 in which the father-gran-

tor was allowed to maintain an action to enjoin his ex-wife's diversion of trust
funds intended for his children. 93 Illustrative of the grantor's right to protect
the remainder interests of his children is Carrv. Carr,94 in which the husbandgrantor sued the trustee to prevent delivery of the corpus of the trust to the
grantor's ex-wife. Although defendants did not contest the grantor's standing,
the court noted that "[it is not denied by counsel for appellee that the donor of
a trust has such interest therein as to entitle him to maintain a suit in equity to
compel the carrying out of the terms thereof. . . -95 The court clearly felt

such standing existed and, although it did not articulate the nature of the gransubtor's interest, the facts of the case suggest that the basis was the grantor's
96
stantial expectation that his children would receive the property.
3. Standing Based on Representation Interests
In addition to basing a grantor's standing on his own economic or
noneconomic interests, his standing may be based on the interests of others, as
92. 16 N.Y.2d 212, 212 N.E.2d 37 (1965), af'g 20 A.D.2d 556, 245 N.Y.S.2d 72 (1963), rev'g
236 N.Y.S.2d 893 (1962).
93. But see Edmondson v. Edmondson, 303 Minn. 157, 226 N.W.2d 615 (1975) (motion to
amend divorce decree).
94. 185 Iowa 1205, 171 N.W. 785 (1919).
95. Id. at 1209, 171 N.W. at 786.
96. Accord Smiley v. Melnick, 56 Misc. 2d 477, 289 N.Y.S.2d 58 (1968). See also Abbot v.
Gregory, 39 Mich. 68, 70 (1878), in which the grantor-father
remained sufficiently interested in [a trust established for the benefit of his daughter] to

enable him to come into court and insist upon the conveyance being made by [the
trustee] in accordance with the agreement. . . in order to prevent a frustration of the
only object which he had in view in making the conveyance ....

Such an interest also is sufficient to support an action at law, in that the promisee of a third-party
beneficiary contract is allowed to enforce it on behalf of the beneficiary. See 2 Restatement (Sec-

ond) of Contracts § 307 (1979). The English courts naturally allow such action, given their refusal
to recognize the validity of third-party beneficiary rights. See Beswick v. Beswick, 1968 A.C. 58
(action by promisee's administratrix seeking specific performance of a contract to pay annuity to
promisee's widow); see also Caulls v. Bagot's Executor and Trustee Co. Ltd., 40 Austl. L.J. Rep.
471,487 (1967) ("It seems to me that contracts to pay money or transfer property to a third person
are always, or at all events very often, contracts for breach of which damages would be an inade-

quate remedy ....").
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their recognized representative. The most common example of such representative standing is that of the grantor-trustee, who as trustee has the right to sue

his cotrustees to redress any wrongdoing by them. 97 It also is reflected, however, in the right of guardians and conservators to sue on behalf of their wards,

and in the right of visitors to sue to enforce charitable foundations and trusts.
The clearest form of representational standing is that of the guardian or

conservator, suing on behalf of his ward. A grantor may sue on behalf of a
beneficiary if a competent court has appointed him as the beneficiary's legal
representative. Thus, if the grantor is or becomes the guardian of a minor or
conservator of an incompetent beneficiary, he has standing to bring an action
against the trustee to enforce any claim of the beneficiary, whether or not the
beneficiary consents. The law invests the guardian with the interests of the
is required to protect adequately the
ward, and allows him to sue. This result
98
interests of the minor or incompetent.
Similar representational standing may be found in those cases in which

grantors who lacked formal appointment were allowed to bring an action on
behalf of beneficiaries. Many cases allow suits by the "best friend" of a minor
beneficiary. 99 These actions are allowed both when the grantor was the beneficiary's parent, t ° ° and when he was the grandparent. 10 ' Again, standing in

this situation may be a necessity, if the interests of the minor are to be adequately represented-a classic justification for standing.' 0 2 'Without grantor
standing, there might be no one to bring the matter before the court,' 0 3 especially when the grantor is not the natural guardian of the beneficiary.

Representational standing may also be found both in the right of a trustee
to redress wrongs committed by cotrustees, and in the right of visitors of charitable trusts and foundations to enforce the terms of the grant establishing the
charity. The trustee is inherently representing the interests of the beneficiaries
97. Having recognized the trustee's right to sue in this context, the courts have imposed on
him the duty to do so. See 2 A. Scorr supra note 2, at § 184; 3 A. Scorr, supra note 2, at § 224.5;
supra note 2 and accompanying text.
98. Because the guardian or conservator has a fiduciary duty to protect the beneficiary's interests, he may be assumed to be willing and able to litigate the beneficiary's interests fully. His
standing to do so is thus justified on theoretical grounds. See Stewart, supra note 47, at 1745.
99. See Abbot v. Gregory, 39 Mich. 68, 70 (1878) (grantor who established trust for daughter
"remained sufficiently interested in the transaction
to enable him to come into court and insist upon the conveyance being made by [the
trustee] in accordance with the agreement. . . in order to prevent a frustration of the
only object which he had in view in making the conveyance. . ."); see also Edmondson
v. Edmondson, 303 Minn. 157, 226 N.W.2d 615 (1975) (motion to modify divorce decree); Rosenblatt v. Birnbaum, 16 N.Y.2d 212, 212 N.E.2d 37, 264 N.Y.S.2d 521 (1965).
100. See cases cited infra note 101.
101. See, e.g., Andrews v. Hurt's Adm'r, 14 Ky. 765 (1893) (abstract).
102. See e.g., Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 102 S.Ct. 3260 (1982)
(parenspatriaeaction).
103. See NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958), in which the NAACP was allowed to sue
on behalf of its members, to oppose a statute requiring disclosure of its members' names. The
court reasoned that it ould be necessary for the members to disclose the very identities they sought
to keep secret, if they were to bring an action challenging the statute. This assumedly would
prevent them from bringing the action, therefore, the action by the organization was necessary for
the protection of the members' privacy.
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whose interests are affected by the alleged breach. The visitors are inherently
representing the public interest in the operation of the charity. 1°4 Both have
the right to challenge the actions of defaulting trustees.' 0 5
The standing of trustees and visitors has a theoretical basis similar to that
which supports the standing of guardians and best friends. In each case the
plaintiff is thought to represent the rights of a beneficiary. The source of the
right of representation is different, however. Whereas guardians and best
friends assume their authority from statute or judicial decision expressly seeking to protect the rights of those who cannot protect their own interests, trustees and visitors derive their authority from the grantor of the trust, either
expressly or by implication from the terms of the trust. The courts apparently
perceive that the grantor intends that the actions of the trustees be subject to
review by visitors or cotrustees, and that those visitors and cotrustees must
have standing to enforce the trust if the grantor's intent is to be carried out.
Assumedly cofiduciaries are selected to provide the beneficiaries with the protection of more than one trustee. This suggests that the grantor does not trust
the beneficiary's ability to protect himself against wrongdoing by a single
fiduciary; in effect, the grantor is making the same judgment that the legislature makes in providing for guardians for the interests of minors and incompetents. Similarly, the reason for appointing visitors is to ensure that the benefits
intended to pass to the public in fact do so, without requiring intervention of
the attorney general-a protective function similar to that of a cotrustee, but
without the latter's active duties. Thus, the grantor is expressing an intent to
subject the trustee's actions to review beyond the ordinary, and suggesting the
appropriateness of the visitor's standing to protect the public's rights. The
cases recognizing that standing validate the importance of the grantor's intent
in identifying those who will have standing to enforce the trust.
Finally, representational standing also has been allowed when the grantor
sues to enforce duties to a group of which he is a member. Even when the
grantor's interest alone is insufficient to support standing, he is allowed to represent others similarly situated, and thus to maintain the action. For example,
some courts have allowed class actions by a representative of all contributors
to a charity, 10 6 or by a representative of all citizens of a town who are affected
by the town's threatened deviation from the terms of a grant of property to it
in trust. 10 7 In the former case, the class action standing allows the action to be
brought in spite of the insubstantial nature of the injury to the individual
104. The attorney general also normally performs this function. See 4 A. ScoTr, supra note 2,

§391.
105. See 3 A. Scorr, supra note 2, § 200.2 (trustee); 4 A. ScoTr, supra note 2, § 391 (visitors).
106. See Rowzee v. Pierce, 75 Miss. 846, 23 So. 307 (1898); Rector of Church v. Crawford, 43
N.Y. 476 (1871) (dictum). But see Clarke v. Oliver, 91 Va. 421, 22 S.E. 175 (1895). In class action
cases, the grantor must have an interest equal to those of the represented class. Thus, although his
interest may not be individually cognizable because of lack of substantiality, it is real and minimally satisfies the traditional injury in fact and zone of interest tests used in traditional standing

analysis.
107. See McIntyre v. Board of Comm'rs, 15 Colo. App. 78, 61 P. 237 (1900); Hartzell v. Hungate, 223 Ill. App. 346 (1921); City of Hopkinsville v. Jarrett, 156 Ky. 777, 162 S.W. 85 (1914);
Perry Pub. Library Ass'n v. Lobsitz, 35 Okla. 576, 130 P. 919 (1913); see also Dunphy v. Common-
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plaintiff's expectations. In the latter case, the action allows the cumulation of
108
insubstantial economic interests to provide a basis for standing.
Representational standing in the trust setting is justified as well under
traditional standing concepts. Although the plaintiff's interest, and thus his

injury, is representational, it is nonetheless real. Further, that interest is within
the zone of interests protected by the trust-in the guardian's case by implica-

tion of law, and in the trustee or visitor's case by inference from the appointment.

More importantly, representational standing is justified by the

underlying factors that standing analysis seeks to reflect. First, in most cases
the representative's position and expertise allow him to appreciate, sometimes

even better than can the beneficiary, the nature of the wrong that has been

committed. 10 9 We presume that wards are incompetent to protect their own

interests, and that guardians are better qualified to do so; a trustee is usually
better equipped to know what constitutes a breach of fiduciary duty than is a

beneficiary; a visitor is more likely to recognize violations of the grantor's intent than are members of the general public or, even, most attorneys general.

Second, because of his expertise, the representative may be in a better position
than the beneficiary to bring the breach to the court's attention, and to assist in

its resolution through litigation. 100 This is particularly true for the visitor, for
example. Thus, recognizing representative standing often will assist in the ef-

fective resolution of controversies, fulfilling a major goal of standing
theory."'
III.

INFERENCES FOR FUTURE CASES

The court's recognition of a grantor's standing to enforce a trust if he has

retained either an economic interest, a substantial expectation interest, or a
representational interest, has natural ramifications beyond the cases in which

these doctrines are applied. It suggests that the grantor would have standing
to bring an action in a number of common situations about which there is
presently no authority. In this section, some of those situations are discussed,
as are the probable results if the grantor's right to bring the action is
challenged.
wealth, 368 Mass. 376, 380 n.2, 331 N.E.2d 883, 885 n.2 (1975) (standing under statute allowing
suit with leave of court by ten taxpayers of county, city, town, or other subdivision).
108. Although class action standing is representational, it also fits within the definition of"surrogate" standing, see Stewart, supra note 47, at 1744-47, in that the individual plaintiff suffers
actual injury. Class actions therefore are not strictly representational if the latter term is used to
indicate standing based solely on the interests of someone other than the person suing. In the
examples given, however, the representational nature of class actions allows the action to be
brought, in that the individual plaintif's injury would be too insubstantial, standing alone, to be
the basis for the action.
109. This factor would also explain the availability of class action standing. See Brilmayer,
The Jurisprudence of,4rticle11" Perspectiveson the "Caseor Controversy"Requirement, 93 HARV.
L. REv. 297, 306-310 (1979); cf. D'Amico v. Schweiker, 698 F.2d 903 (7th Cir. 1983) (administrative law judges lack standing to contest restrictions on the types of fact which they may decide,
even if those restrictions may harm some claimants).
110. See, e.g., Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106 (1976) (doctors allowed to assert patients' interests in challenging state's refusal to pay for nonmedically indicated abortions).
111. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962).
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GrantorStanding Based on Economic Interests

As noted in the preceding section, grantor standing can be based on an
economic interest in the performance of the trust, whether that interest is expressly retained, retained by operation of law, or retained by implication. The
implications of the decisions establishing those principles are outlined in this
section.
1. Express Economic Interests
Little need be said about the standing of a grantor to enforce a trust in
which he has an express economic interest. He has the same right as any other
beneficiary to enforce the trust established for his benefit, just as he would if a
beneficiary assigned him an interest in the trust. Further, this right should
exist whether the interest was retained by the grantor or was received by assignment from another beneficiary. Ownership of the express interest should
determine his right to sue.
Applying this principle should mean that a grantor who has retained an
economic, power exercisable in his own favor can sue to protect the interests
which are subject to that power. For example, it is obvious that a grantor who
retains a power of revocation or a general power of appointment over one or
more trust interests should have standing to enforce the trustee's duties relating to that interest. Although a permissible appointee under an unexercised
power of appointment (other than a power in trust) is usually said not to possess an interest in the trust,"12 the statement cannot be taken to apply to the
holder of a general (or similar) power. Unlike other possible appointees, the
holder of a general power, an unrestricted invasion power, or a power of revocation controls whether he will become a beneficiary of the trust. His power
thus gives him an economic interest in the trust, the value of which is equal to
that of the legal interest that is subject to the power."1 3 Further, that interest is
clearly within the zone of interests intended to be protected by the trustee's
duties. The power therefore should be sufficient to give the grantor who holds
it standing to protect that economic interest, 14 without requiring the exercise
of the power. Thus, the grantor who retains a power to revoke a trust should
be allowed to sue to protect the underlying interest, without first revoking it.
Likewise, a grantor who retains a presently exercisable general power to appoint income or corpus interests should have standing to protect those inter112. See L. SIMES, supra note 16, § 58 ("prospective appointee has a mere expectancy").
113. Cf. Burnet v. Guggenheim, 288 U.S. 280 (1933) (application of gift tax to revocable trust).
The interest of a general power holder is similar to that of a purchaser in escrow. See Hohfeld,
Some FundamentalLegalConceptions as Applied in JudicialReasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16, 48 (1913).
114. The interest possessed by the holder of a general power is inherently more valuable to
him than would be most contingent trust interests, in that the contingency is under his control. It
is for this reason that the holder of a general power is treated as the owner of the appointive
property for the purposes of determining transfer taxes. See I.R.C. § 2041 (1983). Thus, since an
owner of a contingent interest is generally deemed to have standing to enforce the interest to
which he may become entitled, see 3 A. Scorr, supra note 2, § 200, the holder of the general
power should have the same right, including the power to enjoin or obtain redress for breaches of
trust affecting the interest which could be appointed.
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ests, without exercising the power of appointment. 115 Similarly, a grantor who

retains the power to invade corpus for his own behalf should have standing to
bring an action to protect that corpus.
2.

Economic Interests by Operation of Law

As discussed above, if a grantor has an interest in a trust, he has standing

to enforce that interest even if it arises by operation of law.'

16

Therefore, a

grantor may sue to enforce resulting trust interests, whether they arise because

of failure to dispose of the equitable fee, or because of failure of one or more
of those interests. Similarly, reversionary interests that arise under the doc-

trine of worthier title are enforceable.1

17

3. Economic Interests Impliedly Retained
As discussed in part II, a grantor can enforce a trust if the trustee's activities violate an implied economic interest. The principle is applicable to a
number of common situations other than these discussed in part 11.118 Many
situations familiar to estate planners contain the underlying economic interest

and forseeability upon which implied interest standing is evidently based, and
in which standing should exist. Some of the more obvious are discussed here.
a.

Ownership of a concurrent interest in trust assets whose use or sale is
restricted

Cases that recognize the right of a grantor to enforce limitations on the
use of land granted for park purposes, if after the transfer he is an adjacent

landowner, suggest a more general rule: if a grantor transfers to a trust a part
of his ownership interest in nonfungible assets, and the terms of the trust re-

strict the trustee's use of the property or forbid his disposing of it, then the
grantor has standing to enforce the restrictions. In such situations, the circum-

stances suggest that the grantor included the restrictions to protect his investment in the portion of the property that he retained.'

19

To the extent that

115. Because a general testamentary power is of questionable value to the holder, in that it
cannot be used directly to benefit its holder, retention of a general testamentary power does not
give the grantor the clear economic interest that a presently exerciseable power would. Economic
interest standing based on a general testamentary power therefore would not be clearly required.
On the other hand, a testamentary power can be used to benefit the holder, in that it can be
exercised in favor of the holder's creditors, and the holder can thus anticipate the value of the
interest which is subject to the power. Because this possibility is not the normal use of the power,
however, it cannot be said that the interest of the grantor is within the zone of interests which the
grantor intended to create in creating the duties of the trustee. Therefore, his standing to enforce
the interest which is subject to the power is questionable.
116. See supra text accompanying notes 70-71.
117. See supra text accompanying notes 70-71.
118. See supra text accompanying notes 72-76.
119. The ease of replacement of fungible assets would negate any reason to believe that the
particular assets were important to the grantor. Rather, the restrictions on use would suggest that
the grantor thought the assets were a good trust investment, and that the restrictions were intended
to benefit the named beneficiaries. See, e.g., In re Estate of Kettle, 73 A.D.2d 786, 423 N.Y.S.2d
701 (1979).
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violation of the restrictions contained in the trust instrument would affect adversely the value of the retained property, he has an economic interest in what
happens to the portion that he has transferred to the trust. Further, if the
adverse effect was foreseeable at the time the trust was created, it would be
logical to assume that the restriction was placed in the trust to protect the
grantor's interest in the retained property. Thus, his interest in the operation of
the trust was within the zone of interests that the restrictions sought to protect.
Using normal standing analysis, then, he should have standing to enforce the
restrictions.
The principle established by the land use cases is equally applicable to
other cases in which part of the grantor's assets are transferred to a trust, with

restrictions on the use or sale of the transferred assets. For example, if a grantor transfers to a trust some of his shares in a closely-held corporation, and
forbids sale of the shares, the purpose of restriction is assumedly to protect the
value of the shares that the grantor retains. Thus, the grantor should have
standing to bring an action enjoining the trustee's sale of the transferred
shares.
Because standing of this type is based on an implied intent to protect the
value of retained assets, however, a grantor should not have standing to enforce the restriction if he has disposed of the retained assets, or if he has
funded the trust with all of his assets of the type, but later acquired others.
Disposition of the retained assets would negate any possible grantor injury
from a trustee's violation of the restriction, and the circumstances of the creation of the trust would not suggest an intent to give the grantor an interest in
its operation.' 20 Similarly, if he does not retain assets of the type, there is no
reason to imply that the sale restriction was intended to benefit him, so that
later acquisition of similar assets should be irrelevant.
120. The grantor's successor with respect to the previously retained assets also would lack
standing to complain of the trustee's violation of the sale restriction. In the normal course, there is
no reason to presume that the restriction was intended to benefit anyone other than the grantor.
The successor's interest would thus not be within the zone of interests protected by the sale restriction, and the successor would lack standing to complain if the trustee violated it. Whether those
who inherited the grantor's interest similarly would be without standing is more problematical. If
a business is a family business, restricting the trustee's power of sale may be as much for the
protection of other family members as it is for the protection of the grantor in his ownership of
shares. If that is true, then the interest of the grantor's heirs is easily within the zone of interests
that the sale restriction seeks to protect, and they should have standing to enforce it, as long as
they continue to own stock in the corporation.
The heirs' standing to enforce restrictions in the above context does not mean, however, that
heirs can generally enforce restrictions on transferred assets. If, for example, a grantor transfers
part of his land for park or church purposes, it is difficult to say that he intends his successors to
benefit specifically from the proximity of the park or church. It thus cannot easily be said that his
successors' interests in the use of the property are within the zone of interests protected by the
restriction. Thus, his heirs should lack standing to enforce the restriction if other neighboring
landowners would not.
The reader should note that to the extent that successors lack standing to enforce restrictions,
the results suggest that the "traceable injury" test that is currently in vogue in analyzing public law
standing cases lacks the effectiveness of the zone of interests tests. Both successors and heirs could
trace their injury to the trustee's violation of the restriction, but only those who can say that they
were to be protected by the restriction can bring an action to challenge its abuse.
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b. Forseeablemonetary interest in the disposition of trust benets
As discussed in part II, courts have recognized a grantor's standing to
enforce a trust when operation of the trust would produce foreseeable economic gain to him. For example, courts allowed a grantor-father to enforce a
marital separation trust established on behalf of his children.121 Arguably, the

reason for the grantor's standing in this setting is that performance of the trust
would relieve the father of a legal obligation to support his children, even after

divorce. An intention to benefit the father can be implied,

22

making the fa-

ther's interest within the zone of interests for which the trust duties were im-

posed. Denial of that benefit would thus give the father standing to enforce
the trust.
The existence of a forseeable economic interest in the disposition of trust
benefits also should support standing in other trust settings. For example, it is

not uncommon for an individual to establish a discretionary trust for persons
whom he is obligated to support. If the circumstances surrounding the establishing of the trust suggest that the trust was established to relieve the grantor's
support obligation, 123 the refusal of the trustee to provide the beneficiary's

support presumedly would be actionable by the grantor whose support obligation is now unfulfilled. 124 Similarly, nonperformance of a trust established to
pay creditors of the grantor should be actionable by the grantor, 125 unless the

establishment of the trust constituted a novation of the contract,

26

in which

case the creditors would be deemed to be the grantors, and would have the
121. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
122. See Note, supra note 7, at 1374-75.
123. More is required than mere existence of a support obligation at the time the trust is
created, because even if a grantor is obligated to support an individual, he can establish a trust for
that individual without intending that the trust relieve the grantor of his obligations. Thus the
surrounding circumstances must be considered. The classic evidence showing the requisite intent
would be that the trust for children was established pursuant to a divorce agreement. In the
divorce setting, the most likely reason for the trust is to define the grantor's obligation to support
his children after the divorce. Because that definition would impact on his legal obligation, the
intent to benefit from the trust is obvious. The conclusion would have significant income and
transfer tax consequences. If the trust is defined to be for the benefit of the grantor, it is a "grantor
trust," and the income is taxed to the grantor. See I.R.C. § 677 (1983). The trust also may be
included in the grantor's gross estate under I.R.C. § 2036(a)(1) (1983). See Treas. Reg. § 20.2036l(b)(2) (1983).
124. This conclusion comprehends that the trustee has an enforceable duty to the beneficiary.
See, e.g., Emmert v. Old Nat'l Bank, 246 S.E.2d 236 (W. Va. 1978). The result assumedly would
be different if the settlor were under no legal obligation to provide the beneficiary's support. "Cf.
Parker v. Commissioner, 166 F.2d 364 (9th Cir. 1948) (income not taxable to settlor). In such a
case, the grantor's interest in the trust could not be said to have been clearly within the interests
intended to be protected by the trustee's duties, even though he suffered injury in fact from the
failure of the trustee to provide the support amounts. Note further that this illustrates that surrogate standing analysis, see Stewart, supra note 47, at 1744-47, does not fit easily with grantor-trust
cases. In the public law setting, the grantor's increased support liability would assumedly be a
sufficient injury to allow him to litigate the beneficiary's rights. See Sierra Club v. Morton, 405
U.S. 727 (1972).
125. In some cases, such a trust is considered to be solely for the benefit of the grantor-debtor,
and the creditors to be incidental beneficiaries. In this situation, the creditors would lack standing
to enforce the trust. See 2 A. ScoTT, supra note 2, § 126. In other circumstances, the transferee
may be considered to be the agent of the grantor-debtor. Id. § 126.1.
126. See 2 A. ScoTT, supra note 2, § 126.1.
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sole right to enforce the trust. 127 In each hypothetical, nonperformance of the

trust will injure the grantor and the prevention of that injury was the reason
for the trust. In each the grantor's interest was foreseeable, and within the

zone of interests intended to be protected by the terms of the trust. Thus, his
interest should be cognizable, and he should have standing to maintain an

action to enforce the trust.
As noted in part II, implied economic interests can also arise from the

retention of a power over trust property. 28 An example is the interest of the
grantor who retains the right to vote stock transferred to the trust, when he
owns other shares in the company or is employed by the company at the time
of the transfer. 129 Ownership of other shares at the time the voting right is
retained suggests that the power was retained to protect the value of those

shares, or to prevent the possibility of unfriendly management obtaining control of the company. Similarly, if the grantor is employed by the company,
retention of the voting rights in transferred stock suggests a desire to either
protect his employment, or to maintain his position in relation to his corporate
employer. In either case, the retention presumedly would be designed to oper0
13
ate for his benefit, and its violation should be actionable by him.

An implied interest could also be found in the retention of a power to
control investments by the trustee in assets in which the grantor otherwise was

interested. For example, if the grantor retained a power to direct investments,
or required the trustee to obtain the grantor's consent before changing investments, and funded the trust with stock in a closely-held business in which his
interest continued, the circumstances suggest that the restriction was inserted
127. The novation would release the debt of the grantor, and he would therefore have no
interest in the performance of the trust. Thus, he would lack standing to enforce it in any event.
128. See supra notes 75-76 and accompanying text.
129. Although retention of voting rights always suggests an unwillingness to dispose of the
power to determine the economic life of the underlying company, surrounding circumstances will
determine whether the retention is for the grantor's benefit or that of the beneficiaries of the trust.
If, after the transaction, the grantor is otherwise unconnected with the corporation, the retention
of the voting power suggests only a desire to preserve the value of the investment for the beneficiaries, or to control the beneficiaries' rights in relation to the corporation (e.g., the rise of a beneficiary through the ranks of the corporation). On this point, it is interesting to note that there is
some authority that the power to vote stock may not be held by a person who is neither "interested
in the stock nor a representative of persons interested." Clowes v. Miller, 60 N.J. Eq. 179, 47 A.
345 (1900). See also People exrel. Ark. Valley Sugar Beet & Irrigation Co. v. Burke, 72 Colo.486,
212 P. 837 (1923). The restriction was commonly stated in older voting trust cases, see, e.g.,
Robotham v. Prudential Ins. Co., 64 N.J. Eq. 673, 53 A. 842 (1903), but is now in disfavor. See F.
O'NEAL, supra note 76, § 504. Obviously, the value of the right to vote stock can be significant,
particularly if the stock represents a controlling interest in the corporation. See generally Hazen,
Transfers of CorporateControland Dutiesof ControllingShareholders-CommonLaw, Tender Offers, Investment Companies-Anda ProposalforReform, 125 U. PA. L. REv. 1023 (1977).
On the other hand, if the grantor continues to have an interest in the corporation after the
trust is established, that interest raises the presumption that the retention of the power was for the
grantor's benefit.
130. If the grantor's family owns shares in the corporation whose shares are being transferred
into trust, retention of the voting power might also be used to protect the financial health of the
grantor's family, or to protect the grantor's position within the family power structure. The latter
would suggest a noneconomic interest which should be actionable. See infra text accompanying
notes 136-39. The former might give representative standing. See infra text accompanying notes
140-65.
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in the trust to prevent the stock from falling into the hands of interests adverse
to his. The situation would be similar to his having retained the voting rights
with the implication that he retained the power to protect his retained interest
in the underlying asset. His interest in those assets would be within the zone
of interests protected by sale restriction, and enforceable by him.131 If he
owned other stock at the time of the transfer, or was employed by the company whose stock he transferred, he should have standing to enjoin disposition
of the stock by the trust without his consent, as long as he continued to own
stock in the company or be employed by it.
Obviously, whenever the grantor's standing is defended on the ground of
an implied interest, it is not necessary to show an express intent to retain an
enforceable interest. Unlike third parties who seek to establish that they were
"intended beneficiaries"' 132 rather than "incidental beneficiaries,"1 33 and who
must show some active intent to benefit them, the grantor need only show that
his interest was foreseeable at the time the trust was created. As the park cases
suggest, if foreseeability is present, the intent to benefit the grantor is
presumed.
On the other hand, simply because the grantor was benefiting from the
operation of a trust at the time of the trustee's alleged breach should be insufficient to give the grantor standing to challenge the breach. If the grantor's
interest was not in existence or foreseeable when the trust was created, there
would be no reason to assume that the trust was created to protect his interest.
In standing terms, his interest would not be within the zone of interests to be
protected by the trust, and he should lack standing to complain of the trustee's
acts. A grantor should not be able to obtain standing through acts subsequent
to the creation of the trust. Thus, for example, if an owner of a closely held
business placed his stock in an irrevocable trust for the benefit of others, and
did not restrict its sale or retain any power to control its retention, he would
lack standing to complain of its sale by the trustee, even if he continued employment with the company, and even if, in light of the performance of the
stock, its sale constituted a breach of trust in relation to the beneficiaries. Because the grantor did not seek to restrict the sale, no implication arises that the
trustee would have any duties to the grantor. His interest in seeing that the
trust continued its ownership of the stock would not be within the zone of
interests created by the trust, and therefore, only the beneficiaries of the trust
could complain of the sale. Similarly, a grantor who established a discretionary trust in favor of an individual to whom he then owed no obligation of
support would lack standing to complain if later the trustee refused to provide
support payments to the beneficiary, even if, at the time of the alleged breach,
the grantor was obligated to support the beneficiary. Thus, if after a discretionary trust for the benefit of adult children were established one of the children became incompetent, and under local law the parent was responsible for
131. See 2 A. ScoTr, supra note 2, § 185.
132. See id., §§ 126.1 to .3.
133. See Id., § 126.
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the support of incompetent adult children, the grantor would lack standing to
challenge the trustee's exercise of discretion. Because no support obligation
existed at the time the trust was created, no implication that the trust was
established to relieve that obligation would exist. Therefore, the grantor could
not sue on his own behalf, and would have to sue as guardian or best friend of
the child.
Further, when standing is based on implied economic interests, the nature
of the alleged breach is particularly important. The grantor must have standing to complain of the particular wrong; the breach must relate to the grantor's
asserted interest in the trust. Thus, if a grantor creates a trust for the support
of his children, he may sue to require distribution of support payments, 134 but
not to question trust investments, 35 unless he alleged that the investments
were endangering the ability of the trustee to provide the support payments.
The grantor may enforce only the implied obligation to him; he lacks the
power to enforce duties not related to the implied obligation, even if the express beneficiary through whom he claims would have the right.
B. Standing Based on Expectation Interests
Part II discussed circumstances in which the substantial expectations of
the grantor were sufficient to support his standing to enforce the trust. Such a
basis for standing, however, undoubtedly will be rare. Although grantors always expect that the terms of the trust will be followed, it is the unusual case in
which the trust would not have been created except for the expectation that the
alleged breach violates. Most charitable gifts are motivated by generosity and
a desire to help, without regard to the importance of the particular scheme
contained in the granting instrument. Indeed, the entire concept of cy pres
modification of charitable trusts when the specific purpose of the gift becomes
impossible to perform is based on a belief that such general purposes control
gifts. 136 Unless the specific purpose of a charitable gift would prevent application of cypres doctrine, it should be insubstantial enough to prevent the gran137
tor enforcing it in an action against a trustee who violates the restriction.
Grantor standing based on substantial expectation interests also should
be the exception. Rarely does the grantor have a purpose beyond the benefiting of the named beneficiaries of the trust. Undoubtedly, most trusts are established for the members of a grantor's family, and have as their dominant
motive only the present and future well being of the beneficiaries. Although
134. Cf. Rosenblatt v. Birnbaum, 16 N.Y.2d 212, 212 N.E.2d 37, 264 N.Y.S.2d 521 (1965)

(action to enjoin diversion of funds).
135. Cf. Landau v. Ostrow, 50 Misc. 2d 474, 270 N.Y.S.2d 722 (Sup. Ct. 1966) (action for
accounting; no trust found to exist).
136. See 4 A. Scowr, supra note 2, § 399.
137. If the purpose becomes impossible, however, rather than merely violated by the trustee,
the grantor would have standing as the beneficiary of a resulting trust to require return of the trust
assets. See, e.g., Evans v. Abney, 396 U.S. 435 (1970).
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restrictions sometimes are placed on the receipt of those benefits, 138 the reasons for those restrictions usually are secondary to the overriding purpose of
presently furthering the interests of the beneficiaries, 13 9 and are too insubstantial to justify grantor standing based upon them. It therefore should be the
rare case, such as the divorce trust cases noted above, that illustrates standing
on this ground.
C. Standing Based on Representation Interests
As noted in part II, a grantor has standing to enforce a trust if he sues as a
representative of a beneficiary. Two types of representative standing are recognized: representatives, such as guardians and best friends, who are appointed by law or recognized by the court to represent the interests of minors
and others who lack legal capacity to represent themselves, and representatives, such as trustees and visitors, who are appointed by the instrument. Both
types are well recognized, and the latter, in particular, suggests standing in
situations other than those that establish the criteria for representative
standing.
1. Representation of Incapacitated Persons
The standing of guardians, conservators, and best friends to represent the
interests of their wards is outlined in part II. To the extent that an incapacitated beneficiary has a cognizable interest in the trust, his duly appointed representative may sue to enforce the interest. Further, to the extent that the
jurisdiction recognizes the institution of the best friend, an action may be
brought by the best friend on behalf of minors and other beneficiaries incapable of representing themselves. In no instance is a grantor prevented from
qualifying as a representative of either type. Thus, the grantor who is properly
appointed may represent an incapacitated beneficiary.
2.

Representation by Appointment in the Trust Instrument

Representation by appointment in the trust instrument is a more likely
basis for grantor standing. As noted in part II, a grantor who appointed himself trustee has standing to enforce the duties of his cotrustees. Indeed, if he
fails to enforce those duties, he is liable for the wrong that the cotrustees commit.' 40 Similarly, if he appoints himself as visitor to a charitable foundation
or trust he created, he has standing to enforce the charitable gift.
Recognition of the right of representatives appointed by the grantor to
138. See, e.g., Claflin v. Claflin, 149 Mass. 19, 10 N.E. 454 (1889) (payment of corpus over

time).

139. It could be argued that any reasonable grantor expectation should be protected, and thus
give the grantor standing to enforce the terms from which that expectation arose. See Note, supra
note 7, at 1376-77. Standing based on insubstantial expectations, however, would encourage (or

not discourage) frivolous litigation without marked gain to the fairness of the legal system, and
therefore ought not be allowed.
140. See 2 A. ScoTT, supra note 2, § 184 n.3 and accompanying text; 3 A. ScoTT, supra note 2,
§ 224.5.
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enforce trust duties suggests that the grantor also has standing in at least four
situations that previously have not produced litigation.
a. Standing as investment advisor
A grantor who holds either a directory power or a consent power over
trust investments presumedly does so as a fiduciary if he is not also a beneficiary. 14 1 By retaining the investment advisor function, the grantor suggests a
lack of faith in the trustee's investment abilities, and implies the desire that
that trustee function be supervised. If this supervisory power is to have any
meaning, it must be enforceable by the grantor-investment advisor, on behalf
of the beneficiaries. As an investment advisor, he performs like a trustee, and
like a trustee, should be able to bring an action to force the trustee to comply
with his investment decisions.
Because a grantor's standing as an investment advisor is representational,
however, it should not support actions challenging transactions to which the
beneficiary has consented after a full disclosure of the facts. Otherwise, the
grantor would be enforcing the trust against the apparent desires of the person
whose interests were being represented. 142 Thus, a necessary allegation in a
complaint by a grantor-investment advisor who sues on behalf of the trust's
beneficiaries is a lack of consent by the beneficiaries whose interests are affected by the alleged malfeasance.
Further, the grantor-investment advisor's right to enforce the trust would
be limited by the nature of the investment power. For example, trustee inactivity would be actionable if the grantor had a directory power, but not if he
retained merely a consent power. Because a consent power allows its holder
merely to disapprove changes in trust investments, its retention does not suggest that the grantor intended to protect the beneficiaries from trustee inactivity. Therefore, the grantor who holds the power should not be able to question
that inactivity. In contrast, trustee investments without consent would be actionable under either a directory power or a consent power, because the investments would be without direction or consent. The act would be within the
retained area of supervisory responsibility, and should be subject to the grantor's control, suing on the basis of his retained power.
b. Standing under retained dispositivepowers
Representational standing theory also should justify a grantor's action to
enforce compliance with the exercise of dispositive powers he retained. For
example, if he retains the power to direct distribution of corpus to one or more
beneficiaries, he should be able to bring an action to force the trustee to comply with his directions on the distribution of that corpus. 143 Similarly, if he
141. See Carrier v. Carrier, 226 N.Y. 114, 123 N.E. 135 (1919). See generaly 2 A. ScoTT,
supra note 2, § 185.
142. If the investment power is held by the grantor for his own interests, seesupra text accompanying notes 118-135, beneficiary consent would be irrelevant.
143. See Associated Alumni v. General Theological Seminary, 163 N.Y. 417, 57 N.E. 626
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retains a power to accumulate income, he should be able to force the trustee to
comply with a lawful exercise of that power.
Representational standing in this contest is justifiable on a variety of
grounds. First, the grantor's standing is necessary to uphold his full intent at
the time the trust was created. To the extent that his purpose in retaining the
power was to determine the relative rights of the beneficiaries in the future, he
should be able to enforce it in spite of the objections of the trustee or any
beneficiary who is not suijuris. 44 To the extent that his purpose reflected a
distrust of the trustee's discretion, that purpose also would be frustrated if the
trustee were allowed to ignore the grantor's exercise of power. Further, allowing the grantor to bring the action more fully protects the beneficiary's
interest as defined in the trust instrument. Even assuming that the beneficiary
could bring an action to force compliance with the grantor's exercise of power,
requiring the beneficiary to bring such an action requires him to do something
that the grantor clearly sought to protect him from-having to monitor the
trustee's activities. Grantor enforcement, on the other hand, results in the beneficiary obtaining what was intended, without his active intervention. Third,
recognizing the grantor's standing validates the fiduciary nature of his office.
By retaining the dispositive power, the grantor makes himself a fiduciary, and
liable for abuse of power. Were the trustee given the same power, he would
have a duty to the beneficiary to exercise the power for the beneficiary's interest, and the exercise of the power would be reviewable,1 45 but he would have
total control over its effectiveness. By retaining the power, the grantor puts
himself in the shoes of the trustee for this purpose. If he is to have the power
of a trustee, however, he must have the right to enforce his exercise of the
power, a right that would be inherent if he held the power as a trustee.
c. Retention of a generaldirectorypower not heldfor his own benefit

The grantor also should have standing to enforce his directions (or to
prevent the trustee from acting without direction) when he retains a general
46
power to direct the trustee, even if the power is not held for his own benefit.'
If the power is retained for the purpose of ensuring the interests of the benefi(1900) (retained right to name holder of donated professorship). Cf.Williams v. Stevens, 335 Ill.
App. 123, 80 N.E.2d 451 (1948) (abstract).
144. If all beneficiaries are suijuris, then they would have the right to adjust their interests
between them if their interests were not subject to a spendthrift clause. Further, even if a spendthrift clause existed, they might be able to disclaim interests in favor of other beneficiaries. In that
case, the grantor's desires would become irrelevant, and he should lack standing to enforce them.
In either event, recognizing the beneficiaries' right to adjust their own interests would be consistent with the concept of "self-determination" as developed in constitutional standing cases. See
Brilmayer, supra note 109, at 130-15.
145. See First Nat'l Bank v. Department of Health, 284 Md. 720, 399 A.2d 891 (1979).
146. If the grantor retains a general directory power for his own benefit (as might be the case if
the trust included assets in which the grantor had a personal economic interest), his standing
would be personal, not representative. Such powers must, of course, be exercised consistent with
the rights of other beneficiaries. See Chase Nat'l Bank v. Reinecke, 10 N.Y.S.2d 420 (Sup. Ct.
1938) (requested loan improper when it would put assets of trust in jeopardy).
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ciaries, the grantor holding it is deemed to be the trustee.' 4 7 For analytic pur-

poses, the named trustee is the agent of the grantor-trustee, whose power is
limited to holding title to the assets and executing the grantor's directions. In

such an analytic setting, the grantor would, as a trustee, have a representational right to enforce the trust. He would also have a personal economic
interest in doing so, based on his potential liability as trustee for wrongdoing.
Indeed, the grantor's standing should exist even if the trustee were held to

have a fiduciary duty to question whether the grantor's directions constituted a
breach of trust, 148 because his standing is based on his own duty to represent

the interests of the beneficiaries.
d

Retention of corrective oversightpowers

A grantor may also have standing to enforce a trust based on an expressly
retained right to do so. As noted in part II, the right of overseers to enforce
trusts is recognized in the case of visitors to charitable foundations and
trusts. 14 9

Indeed, in the case of gifts to charitable foundations, the appoint-

ment of visitors is presumed.15 0 Further, although its roots are in the enforcement of gifts to charitable corporations, the validity of visitorial powers' 5 1 also
is recognized with respect to noncorporate charitable trusts. Indeed, although
there is authority that the law does not imply a visitorial right from the mere
creation of a charitable trust (as opposed to the creation of a charitable corporation), 152 authority to the contrary exists, 153 and, in any event, the donor expressly may reserve the right.154 The standing of a visitor is as a representative
of the interests of the public at large.' 55
Assumedly, a grantor has standing to enforce a similar retained oversight
power over a private trust. Analytically, there is no reason to limit the standing of named overseers to charitable trusts and foundations. If a grantor can

appoint a representative for the interests of beneficiaries in the one situation,
he should be able to do so in the other. He could do so in either situation were
147. See Carrier v. Carrier, 226 N.Y. 114, 123 N.E. 135 (1919).
148. See 2 A. ScoTr, supra note 2, § 185.
149. As to the existence of the right, compare Trustees of Andover Theological Seminary v.
Visitors of Theological Inst., 253 Mass. 256, 148 N.E. 900 (1925), with Wier v. Howard Hughes
Medical Inst., 407 A.2d 1051 (Del. Ch. 1979).
150. See, e.g., Trustees of Putnam Free School v. Attorney Gen., 320 Mass. 94, 67 N.E.2d 658
(1946); MacKenzie v. Trustees of Presbytery, 67 N.J. Eq. 652, 61 A. 1027 (1905); State ex rel.
College of Bishops v. Board of Trust of Vanderbilt Univ., 129 Tenn. 279, 164 S.W. 1151 (1914).
Contra Fuller v. Trustees of Plainfield Academic School, 6 Conn. 532 (1827); Leeds v. Harrison, 7
N.J. Super. 558, 72 A.2d 371 (Ch. 1950).
151. For a history of visitorships, see generally 4 A. ScOTr, supra note 2, § 391; Pound, Visitoriai JurirdictionOver Corporationsin Equity, 49 HARV. L. REv. 369 (1936).
152. See, e.g., MacKenzie v. Trustees of Presbytery, 67 N.J. Eq. 652, 61 A. 1027 (1905).
153. See, e.g., Healy v. Loomis Inst., 102 Conn. 410, 420, 128 A. 774, 777 (1925); Attorney
Gen. v. Parker, 126 Mass. 216, 220-221 (1879).
154. See BOGERT, supra note 2, § 391; but see 4 A. ScoTr, supra note 2, § 391.
155. When the power is recognized, it is often held to exclude enforcement of the charity by
the attorney general, because his role is visitorial in nature. See, e.g., Attorney Gen. v. Dulwich
College, 4 Beav. 255, 49 Eng. Rep. 337 (1841). Contra State v. Taylor, 58 Wash. 2d 252, 362 P.2d
247 (1961).
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he to name himself a cotrustee. In many situations, as when all beneficiaries
are minors, unborn, or unknown, the inability of the beneficiaries to protect
their own interests is similar to that of the public to enforce a charitable
trust. 156 Although in both charitable and private trust contexts, any economic

relief would inure to the beneficiaries, as it would if the grantor were suing a
cotrustee,157 by appointing himself to protect those interests, the grantor indi-

cates a sufficient interest in the outcome of the litigation to justify faith that he
will litigate fully the beneficiaries' rights. His standing thus would be justified
158
using normal standing analysis.

A grantor's standing to enforce a corrective oversight power over a pri-

vate trust also is explainable by analogy to the treatment of trustees. In retaining a corrective oversight or visitorial power, the grantor assumes a role
somewhat similar to that which he would have had if he had appointed him-

self as a cotrustee but with responsibilities limited to overseeing the actions of
his cotrustees. Were the grantor to have named himself as a cotrustee, he
would have standing to enforce the trust, 159 perhaps even without joining the
represented beneficiary as a party to the action. 160 That he wished to assume

the same role without adopting the mantle of a trustee is unimportant to the
question of his standing.
The difficulty with explaining the grantor's standing by analogizing his
position to that of a trustee is that the explanation proves too much. Trustees

have fiduciary obligations in exercising the oversight power. Cotrustees generally are liable if they negligently or wrongfully fail to bring an action that
should have been brought to protect the interests of the beneficiary. 16' Mere
retention of an oversight power, on the other hand, suggests only the grantor's

desire that he have the right to correct trustee abuses, not the duty to do so.
156. Recognition of the concept need not be limited to such groups, however. First, charitable
trusts are generally enforceable by the attorney general, and thus the "beneficiaries" are not without representation, even without validation of the standing of visitors. Second, the concept of
vesting in one person the right to enforce legal rights of another person is well recognized in other
areas of the law. Indeed, in some settings, the right of representation can be exclusive of enforcement by the person whose rights are at issue, see, e.g., Black-Clawson Co. v. International Ass'n of
Machinists Lodge 355, 313 F.2d 179 (2d Cir. 1962) (sole right of union to enforce arbitration right
of member), subject only to a possible action for abuse of the representation. See Brown v. Sterling Aluminum Prod. Corp., 365 F.2d 651 (8th Cir. 1966).
157. The grantor's standing to enforce private oversight powers also could be analyzed on
grounds personal to him. By naming himself to oversee trustee activity, he implies that the performance of the trustees is a significant expectation in creating the trust. Thus, he should have
standing to enforce the performance, based on injury to that expectation. See supra notes 136-139
and accompanying text.
158. It also is not possible to limit express or implied oversight standing to charitable trusts on
the ground that visitors constitute a delegation of the function of the attorney general. First, the
reverse is sometimes stated: that the attorney general fulfills a visitorship role. See, e.g., Attorney
Gen. v. Dulwich College, 4 Beav. 255,49 Eng. Rep. 337 (1841). Second, that analysis would make
the attorney general's right to authorize ex rel. proceedings largely surplusage, and indeed, would
undercut the attorney general's authority to represent the interest of the state. See State v. Taylor,
58 Wash. 2d 252, 362 P.2d 247 (1961).
159. See Killen v. Houser, 239 Md. 79, 210 A.2d 527 (1965).
160. Compare id. with Miele v. Miele, 124 Vt. 110, 197 A.2d 787 (1964).
161. Cf. In re Estate of Rothko, 43 N.Y.2d 305, 320, 372 N.E.2d 291, 296, 401 N.Y.S.2d 449,
455 (1977) (liability of cotrustee).
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For example, visitors-whose standing to enforce a trust is similarly the result
of the grantor's appointment-are not clearly liable for failing to correct
abuses by the trustees of the charities for which they are appointed; evidently,
they have the power to enforce the trust, but not the duty to do so.
In the end analysis, of course, the theory supporting the grantor's standing
is less important than the fact that the standing exists. The grantor, by retaining the oversight power, is not attempting to create a cause of action,1 62 but is
merely attempting to define who could bring the matter to the court for resolution. By retaining that power, he is appointing himself as a representative of
the beneficiaries for the purposes of enforcing their rights against the trustee,
under circumstances which suggest that he is sufficiently concerned with their
interests that his representation will be adequate for standing purposes. By his
own act, he has defined his concerns as within the zone of interests to be protected by the trustee's duties. 63 Further, recognizing his right to bring the
action would not adversely affect the interests of the beneficiaries, whether the
grantor's position is analogized to that of the visitor or trustee. Retention of
the power would not bar the beneficiary from bringing his own action to enforce the trust, because the right of cofiduciaries to redress breaches of trust is
coextensive with that of the beneficiaries.164 Nor would the power prevent the
beneficiaries from consenting to the action of the trustee, and thus barring the
enforcement action of the grantor; the interests being represented would be
theirs, not his.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Although it is occasionally and loosely stated that a grantor lacks standing to enforce a trust, that statement is clearly too broad. Courts have found a
grantor to have standing to enforce a trust he created in a number of situations. Further, these situations do not all reflect the categories-beneficiary,
trustee, promisee-traditionally used to determine whether an individual can
enforce a trust. Rather, the grantor's standing is analyzed better on the basis
of whether he has an interest, economic or otherwise, in the performance of

the trustee's duties. If he possesses such an interest, and that interest is within
162. See Stokes v. Moore, 262 Ala. 59, 77 So. 2d 331 (1955) (questioning contractually-defined

right to bring specific performance action on covenant not to compete); see generally Macneil,
Power of ContractandAgreedRemedies, 47 CORNELL L.Q. 495, 520-23 (1962).
163. The position of the grantor in this setting is similar to that of the plaintiffs in Havens
Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363 (1982), who, though not wishing to rent apartments themselves, were held to have standing to enforce the Fair Housing Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. § 3604
(1976), as "testers." They were no more than self-appointed representatives of who would be

interested in apartment rentals. In the trust context, the grantor's interest is defined by the trust
instrument; in Havens, it was defined by statute. Further, the retention of the oversight power
suggests that the grantor perceives that the beneficiaries need that protection, and thus to paraphrase the court in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 481 (1965): "The rights of [the beneficiaries], pressed here, are likely to be diluted or adversely affected unless those rights are
considered in a suit involving those who have this kind of confidential relation to them." See
Albert, Standingto ChallengeAdministrativeAction: An InadequateSurrogate/orClaimfor Relle/,
83 YALE L.J. 425, 466 (1974).

164. See BOoERT, supra note 2, § 871; 3 A. Scorr, supra note 2, § 200.2.
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the zone of interests sought to be protected by those duties, then the grantor
can bring an action to enforce the trust. In a broad sense, if the grantor has an
economic, expectation, or representational interest in the trust, such that he
can be trusted to fully and fairly litigate the validity of the transactions that he
challenges, and his interest was foreseeable at the time the trust was created,
he can maintain the action.
Second, the variety of bases for grantor standing suggests that he would
have standing to enforce a trust in a number of situations that previously have
not been litigated. Analysis of his foreseeable interest suggests, for example,
that the grantor of a revocable trust can enforce it without first exercising his
right of revocation. Similar conclusions can be drawn with respect to the right
of a grantor to enforce retained consent or directory powers over trust
investments.
Finally, comparison of the problem of resolving a grantor's right to enforce a trust, with the problems inherent in the public law standing cases, suggests that public law standing is not the unique area it has been thought to be,
and that there may be a generalized law of standing. If there is, then analysis
of the grantor-enforcement cases suggests that at least one factor in public law
standing analysis-what is known as the "zone of interest" test-may have
greater significance than public law scholars currently think that it possesses.

